Political Science

Part 1
Richard Clarke made several attempts to persuade the White House to focus more attention on the Al Qaeda threat but he proved unsuccessful in influencing shifts in counterterrorism measures during the Bush administration. When President George W. Bush  assumed the highest office of the country, he inherited the still-pending issue of the USS Cole, which in Clarkes viewpoint galvanizes the observation that al Qaeda remains to be the most dangerous threat to U.S. national security.  Clarke and colleagues from the counterterrorism unit were dismayed that no military response was initiated during the Clinton administration, one colleague even retorting Does al Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention (911 Commission, 2004, p. 196). As early as January 2000, Clarke gave briefings to Condoleezza Rice, her deputy Hadley, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell that warning the global adaptability of al Qaedas network. Thereafter, Clark, through Rice, made several attempts to seek an audience with the new President in an effort to persuade the new administration to make terrorism a high priority. He submitted a comprehensive memorandum entitled Strategy for Eliminating the Terrorist Threats from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida Status and Prospects concluding that we urgently need a Principals level review on the al Qida network (911 Commission, 2004, p. 201).  In a memo dated January 25, Clarke made a recommendation to Rice that the U.S. should come up with a proper response to the Cole attack at a time, place, and manner of our own choosing (911 Commission, 2004, p. 202). George Tenet briefed Bush on the USS Cole attack sometime in January 2000 making a preliminary assessment that ties al Qaeda directly to the attack but finding insubstantial evidence to find bin Laden as the mastermind. Despite repeated efforts, pleas from Clarke and Tenet seemed to have fallen into deaf ears. The Bush administration was largely indifferent, complacent, and blithe despite several warnings and alarms sent not only by Clarke but by other officials of the counterterrorism unit. The  Bush administrations priorities lie elsewhere, particular, on China, missile defense, Middle East peace process, and the Persian Gulf (911 Commission, 2004, p. 199). Clarke made a last-minute attempt to brief the President on August 6, 2001 but his Daily Briefing Memo was scrapped, Rice justifying later that the memo did not mention any attacks inside the United States (911 Commission Report, 2004, p. 205).

Clarke continuously requested for the Principals to convene and  discuss the al Qaeda threat seriously, but no meeting was held until September 4, 2001, seven days before the 911 bombings.
The Bush administrations indifference coupled with the breakdown of the U.S. intelligence process has been blamed for the events leading up to the tragedy of September 11, 2001. In particular, the lack of cooperation between and among federal agencies drew out the most criticisms for this breakdown. In July 10, 2001, a memo, now coined the Phoenix memo was drafted by an operative named Kenneth Williams from FBIs Phoenix Bureau, warning that al Qaeda may be sending students to U.S. flight training schools for terrorist activities and urged the FBI to look into the matter. The memo recommended, Phoenix believes that the FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviationuniversitiescolleges around the country ( Gertz, 2002, p. 83 ). Williams 5-page memo was left unheeded by the FBI - a blunder of monumental proportions (Gertz, 2002, p. 85). It was received by the Radical Fundamentalist Unit and never got far. As it turned out, had the memo been acted upon promptly, it would have most likely prevent the 911 tragedy. Since the Phoenix memo was ignored, it was not analyzed and shared across other intelligence agencies like the FBI  Minneapolis field office. Agents stationed there had arrested Islamic extremist Zacarias Moussaoui based on a tip from a civil aircraft training school employee. Williams said later that had the FBI acted upon a crucial piece of information and authorized an investigation of flight training schools, the 911 plot would have been frustrated.

Part 2  Questions 2 and 3
(2) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (hereinafter Miranda) held that exculpatory and inculpatory statements given  by a defendant in response to police interrogation will be admissible in court only if four warnings are given to the defendant a) the right to remain silent , b) anything he says may be used against him, c) right to an attorney present during interrogation, d) if indigent, a right to lawyer free of charge. The landmark case was decided on a slim 5-4 vote, and the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Harlan, articulates the many flaws of the decision. Among the problems the dissenters found was that Miranda was leading not toward the elimination of police brutality as it asserts, but to discourage confessions altogether. This poses several drawbacks to law enforcement ,where suspect questioning is intrinsic and considered undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law enforcement (citing Crooker v. California). Miranda aims to provide a protective shield for the accused against coercion and other cajoling tactics that would force a defendant to confess absent the element of voluntariness. The dissenters affirm the Constitution disfavors spontaneous confessions and agree that although confessions may be inherently suspect due to the accusatorial nature of interrogation and the compelling environment that the defendant may be subjected to, current tactics of interrogation have already taken into consideration due process concerns. However, dissenters argued that Mirandas inadmissibility rule is hazardous experimentation.

(3) U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton (hereinafter US Term Limits) dealt with the nature of sovereignty and the limitations of the State in the exercise of sovereign powers, especially those that dealt with the imposition of congressional qualifications. US Term Limits rejects the argument that States are empowered to impose qualifications by virtue of the original powers granted by the Tenth Amendment. The majority opinion, penned by Justice Stevens, provides two major reasons. First, the power to attach additional qualifications is not within the purview of the States original powers prior to the Tenth Amendment, but is a new right originating from the Constitution itself (Hall, 1999).

Second, this would be inconsistent with the intent of the Framers in a uniform national legislature to represent the citizens of the United States.  Another landmark decision, U.S. v. Lopez, bolstered the limitations of Congress legislative power. In this case, legislative power was exercised in conflict with commerce power. The case decided on whether or not Congress has the power to legislate policies designed to control the public school system. In a narrow decision, the Court struck down the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, finding that it exceeds the bounds of federal commerce power (Hall, 1999, p. 165).

Part 3  Questions 1, 2, and 7
(1) Certiorari refers to a type of writ which seeks judicial review. Certiorari, which in Latin means to be more fully informed is a remedy that brings a decision made by a lower court to a higher court for review (Black, 1970). In the US legal system, certiorari is a writ issued by the US Supreme Court to a lower court in order to review the latters judgment for possible legal errors where appeal is no longer accessible.  However, when a writ for certiorari is granted, this does not mean that the Supreme Court opposes the lower courts decision. Granting of a writ, which requires the vote of at least four Justices, indicates that the Court has deemed the circumstances and nature of the petition substantial for review.

(2) Stare decisis is a legal doctrine, which translated in Latin means to stand by that which is decided (Black, 1970). This is often referred to as the precedent principle practiced and adhered to by the courts. This doctrine purports that once a point has been settled with a decision, cases of like nature are to be similarly decided. The stare decisis doctrine is founded on the assumption that the major objectives of the legal system  certainty, stability, and predictability  are fundamental elements of jurisprudence, but does not prevent reexamination or revocation of earlier judgments of decisions.
(7) The landmark case, U.S. v. Lopez, determined the limits of legislative power specifically in relation to the enactment of laws seeking to control the public school system. In response to the escalating incidence of gun-related violence in the public schools, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1990. Alfonzo Lopez, a senior high school student of San Antonio, Texas was arrested for the possession of a .38 caliber handgun in violation of the Gun-Free Act (Hall, 1999).

After sentenced to six months in prison by the federal district court, Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit where the latter reversed the earlier decision, citing unconstitutionality. The Fifth Circuit argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an invalid exercise of commerce power by Congress. The US Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Fifth Circuit. Until now, US v. Lopez is considered one of most important cases affirming state sovereignty.