Zakaria draws the distinction between illiberal and liberal democracy. He states that the word democracy is automatically viewed as liberal democracy by the west as they feel it should always be in conjugation with the rule of law, separation of powers, civil liberties like freedom of speech, religion and property.
History has shown a marked trend of constitutionalism frequently being imposed, be it by direct interference, or indirectly, by incentivizing the inclusion of certain norms in a states constitutional framework. The dynamics of contemporary imposed constitutionalism, Feldman argues, reflect that the constitutional drafting process is a negotiation among local political elites of a state, the imposing state, and international organizations capable of exerting pressure. It is relevant in the first place to see how and why an imposition of constitutionalism is justified. Feldman proposes the argument that in nations being built (or in todays day and age, rebuilt), there is no government of elected representatives in place, and political power is concentrated in the hands of the local elite, whose interests are very unlikely to coincide with those of the public at large. While this might be a genuinely sincere motivation, it is an interesting assumption that while the local elite will act on pure self-interest, a foreign state will make the needs of the local public its focus. This brings us to the next leg of the act of imposition what ideals are being imposed and why.
The primary motivation for imposing a specific brand of constitutionalism on any state is arguably to ensure that its framework and functions are suited to popular international taste. Liberal democratic constitutionalism is the forerunner in the system sought to be imposed. The tenet of equality and the need to have an egalitarian society form the very fabric of western liberal democracy, and hence, cannot be emphasized enough. In this context, Feldman draws from the examples of the recent drafting of the constitutions of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the unequal status of women prescribed by the Sharia was heavily criticized, and the clear assumption that the principles of egalitarianism must be automatically adopted if a state adopts democracy. In justifying why a liberal democratic framework must necessarily be adopted, the most common argument is that it minimizes illiberal regimes and failure of the rule of law, and additionally, inculcates a greater sense of respect for human rights. The latter is why there is commonly interference by the third party in imposed constitutionalism, international human rights organizations and non-government organizations, which, when they have leverage, influence the framing of the constitution of a state being built.
Apart from these unquestionable altruistic motives, it is often argued that homogeneity in terms of political order is desirable to provide for a larger market suited to the needs of producers in Western liberal democratic states, since the political order which is sought to be imposed allows for a liberalized economy and predictability of the legal framework, both of which are important for free trade. It is noteworthy, in this context, that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund often prescribe guidelines which must be followed, which require a country to create a favorable environment for foreign trade, before they are given financial aid. In bilateral trade agreements also, the state which wields greater power often influences the economic policies of the other as a precondition to enter into the agreement. Hence, to the end of imposing constitutionalism, leverage and pressure is applied by the imposing states in various forms and degrees from over-the-table persuasion and discussion with the local political forces in a state, to imposing trade barriers and other economic sanctions like in the case of Iraq or South Africa, when the tenets of liberal democracy are not observed.
This brings me to the second aspect of my paper. While, empirically, such pressure tactics have, to use a controversial term, necessary (like in the case of South Africa where they were used to force the government to bring an end to its shockingly racist policies), what is worthy of discussion is whether the exercise of coercing states to turn liberal democratic is in itself not a compromise on the ideals of liberal democracy, in that it is depriving peoples of a state of the right to self-determination, and the state itself of its autonomy. The most obvious argument against imposed constitutionalism is that it is a clear case of compromising a states autonomy. Feldman identifies this to be a conflict between egalitarianism and autonomy, which forms the crux of the problem of modern forms of imposed constitutionalism. While advocates of the liberal democratic framework think it desirable to have an unflinching doctrine of equality to be in place in a state, such a case of extreme equality may be undesirable by a majority of the people of the concerned state. This, Feldman suggests, is the case of states like Iraq, which are predominantly Muslim states, where the religious ideals itself make a case against inclusion of women, and are hence inherently supportive of an unequal regime.
In connection with this, it is also argued that the imposing state often fails to take note of local needs and customs in prescribing a standard formula of liberal democracy, which is supposed to be successful with all countries, no matter how diverse, alike. It is interesting to note Diamonds argument in this regard, which emphasizes that regardless of economic and political background, and the literacy of its citizens, all states are suited for democracy. It is, however, difficult to reconcile his argument with the empirical evidence provided by countries like Pakistan, where despite an attempt to enforce democracy, the political environment made it possible to have a far-from-democratic military regime, or even countries like India, which though touted to be the largest democracy in the world, has frequent incidents of poll-capturing and rigged elections. Feldman makes an important point in this regard about how it is impossible to practically enforce any imposed ideals without cooperation of the elite locals anyway. In this context, he gives the example of the United States, where even after the Southerners adopted the constitutional norm prescribing equal rights to African-Americans, the political reality did not reflect racial equality, for the people had not accepted this norm which would be necessary to make it a custom.
Zakaria argues that democracy without liberalism is dangerous. He says the biggest problem is that is gains legitimacy by virtue of being democratic. Hence, not only does it pose a danger to the citizens of the country were it is imposed, but also might discredit democracy and democratic process completely. His argument is that every wave of democracy has had to suffer setback which directly points of the fact that there were institutional and systemic inadequacies which led to the failure of democracy. Hence, he argues for a more authoritarian regime prior to the advent of democracy wherein these institutional problems are taken care of.
Having said this, I do not doubt that the liberal democratic framework is the most stable and pro-people framework that we have in place as far as political regimes go. Also, as stated before, there are usually very good reasons for one state to interfere in the policy-making and nation building of another, not least because the latter is too unstable to do this on its own. However, nation building has come to mean the attempt to apply the standard formula of western liberal democracies to nations across the board to yield a state which is civilized and acceptable as per the norms of the international community. While it might be necessary to ensure protection of human rights and the rule of law across nations, the imposing state must bear in mind that pressurizing a state to adopt liberal democratic policy not only compromises the very tenets of liberal democracy itself, but also leads to a situation where while the norms may be embodied in the constitutional text, they will have no real effect since the people of the state will not give them the importance attached to laws which are reconciled with their beliefs and practices. Hence, imposing constitutional and nation building ought to be done cautiously and in as limited a manner as possible.
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