Political Science

General Book Review

I. Introduction
In Platos political writings, he is primarily concerned with an analysis of the nature of the individual and the state. Plato perceived the state as an analogous appendage of the individual. He believed that the type of individual found in the state determined the class of state it would be. In a sense, the individual is the nominal reflection of the state. In The Republic, Plato argued

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment  and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons --if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State (The Republic).

Because the state is determined by individuals, then individuals are classified based on their contributions to the state. The commoners provide manpower to the state. The army protects the state from external threats. The Guardians are bestowed with the power of governance  a class of intellectual aristocrats. To prevent conflict between the classes, the Guardians must possess the highest virtues of the state. The Guardians are required to live in poverty  all possessions are deemed communal. They must have families in common. Children will be raised in common  so as not to sow envy among the classes. They are also required to study philosophy and law  the requisites of good leadership.

Now, this structure of the state is directed to the Form of the Good. In essence, this is the cause of knowledge and truth  the source of the right to think as a being, as a rational individual it is in essence, higher than the individual. The Good is not something which can be readily perceived. It is an external form which is identical to objectivity, but not an object itself. As Plato said

The Good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their existence and reality yet it is not itself identical with reality, but is beyond reality, and superior to it in dignity and power (The Republic, 508-509).

Because the Good is beyond reality, or as in the case of Aquinas, far from the rubric of human imagination (Summa Theologica), it is the source of all virtues. If the state, in one way or another, attains this form, such state becomes a mirror image of the ideal state. Citizens become bearers of virtue.

In his latter works, primarily the Laws, Plato modified some of his earlier assumptions of the state. Plato allowed some form of private property. The ancient ruler-philosopher stands as the primary focus of attention. Having attained the status of a wise ruler, the state itself becomes a just entity. There is also a pretence of piety and ritualism in the state  written law is absent, so as vice and idealistic happiness. The state is indeed the repository of God-given virtues. As Plato argued

Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbors, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty savior would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbors are so good. Still we may be content (Book IV, The Laws).

Plato, however, recognized the existence of efficient forms of government. His ideal state is, in his mind, the best form of political association. As such, the laws which govern the state tend to be variable. In The Laws, Plato commented

You are aware-are you not-that there are of said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we have already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now you must regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form of government this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice (Book IV, The Laws).

In the Statesman, Plato presented his ideal ruler  the political entity which provides direction and guidance to the state. This work is the culmination of his political philosophy because it defines the nature of the state from the perspective of erratic rationalism.

II. Summary (Statesman)
The first part of the book deals with the nature of classes. According to Plato, beings can be classified into sub and sub-sub classes. Suppose beings are classified based on corporeality, then two classes emerge  the incorporeal and the corporeal. Corporeal beings can be subdivided into two groups  the animate and the inanimate. Again, animate beings can be classified into two groups  the rational and the irrational. This successive division of classes corresponds to a unique distinction between the general class and the high class (this is not synonymous with the upper class).

At this point, the Stranger introduces the investigation of the sophist with the model of an angler. In general, the angler represents the method of dichotomous division  the division of a kind into sub-classes. An angler has a humble profession which nature recognizes. The animal engages in a single discernable activity  that is, fishing with a special hook. Now, the Stranger arrives at a definition of the angler by locating his activity in a wide class of art or technique. The Stranger then assumes that art is divided into two types productive and acquisitive art. This method yields a special kind of definition for the Sophist. To the Stranger, the sophist is a hired hunter of rich young men  acquisitive men who vie for money, pride, and inordinate hunger of power. A metaphor can be established while the angler hunts creatures that inhabit the water, the sophist hunts (or corrupts) creatures that live on dry land. As
Plato argued
That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest result. And now, I will not wait for you to ask the, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king (Statesman 201).

With this method, the Stranger (the character in the treatise) and Socrates arrive at a discernable distinction between the real statesmen and the sophists.

The Stranger introduces a vague definition of a statesman. According to him, the statesman is an individual of science  a person higher than the sophist in virtues but lower than a philosopher. He than argues that it is the type of soul which conceive the ail kinds of knowledge between the sophist and the statesman. The sophist possesses a corrupt form of knowledge  knowledge which is erratic, unreliable, and self-directed. The statesman possesses a genuine, heavenly inspired knowledge  knowledge which recognizes the efficacy of man.

The Stranger then presents a straightforward definition of the Sophist
Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,-here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid (Statesman 204).

There is, however, a problem with this definition. It is impossible to make a moral dichotomy with regard to knowledge creation. Knowledge is pure and absolute. It is time immemorial  God have decreed that knowledge is the Ideal Form of the Forms. It is, in essence, the subject and object of existence. There is no such thing as two knowledge. As God is absolute, so is knowledge. As the Stranger puts it

Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite courses or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round  the world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot (Statesman 206).

Now, knowledge is a part which was the science of rule or command, on the analogy of selling-for-self (Statesman 206). Sophists take knowledge as part of their essence  hence, they assume that knowledge can be manipulated or controlled. Statesmen, on the other hand, view knowledge as an inanimate entity - distinct and separate from the body. To the statesman, knowledge is a measure of personal dedication to the good of the state, the individual, and nature.

The nature of knowledge, however, is complicated. Knowledge came from God. From God, the instructor, the world received all that is good. Man became a benefactor of the good. Ideal forms entered the mind of men  those who recognized its good vowed to make themselves the conveyor of truth, while those who recognize its immediate utility vowed to contain it.

The Stranger concludes that knowledge is inherently good. The manner by which knowledge is utilized can be deemed either good or bad. The Sophists use knowledge to their own advantage (a corrupt form of knowledge) while statesmen utilize knowledge to the advantage of other men and the state.

Having distinguished the sophist from the statesman, both Socrates and the Stranger discuss the nature of statecraft. Like weaving, statecraft is an art which cares for human cities. In weaving, the weaver is expected to be both moderate and cautious  to meet the requirements of his clients. In statecraft, the statesman must be an expert of measurement  they measure the more and the less not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the production of the measure. The statesman directs the experts. He is an expected to be an expert in timing to determine when the general should go to war. He must determine the good that rhetoric will serve. He must decide whether a particular goal is best achieved through force or persuasion. The statesman must be just and merciful to show the citizens the subject of justice.

III. General Critique
A thorough reading of the text will reveal important facts. First, the Statesman is an extension of The Republic. Plato repeatedly argued that a just society is a society where the highest Good is directed. This is the base assumption of his work. As the philosopher strive to arrive at the highest Good, the statesman struggle to implement the ideal form of justice. The Good is assumed to be inanimate  beyond the rubric of human comprehension. It is also flawless and natural. It rests not on the minds of individuals but on the divine being  in which man is the recipient.

Second, Plato apparently modified some of his original ideas in The Republic. In the Statesman Plato allowed some form of private ownership. In The Republic, property is communal. The philosopher-king is the object of discussion in The Republic  being the source of good in the state. In this work, Plato assumes that the statesman is a necessary appendage of the state in the promulgation of justice.

IV. Conclusion
In the Statesman, Plato defined the essence of knowledge  its source, cause, and application. He also pondered on the various classifications which animate beings are situated. A formal result of this differentiation is the statesman-sophist divide. This divide is located in the rubric of statecraft.