FEMA and Katrina

FEMAs response to Katrina, a raging sea of water that pounded the Gulf Coast, raised eyebrows as people assessed its performance as it carried out its disaster management programs in reaction to the fearsome level 5 rated hurricane. Many pitfalls in FEMAs response rose questions that primarily queried whether plans, regulations as well as procedures and policies together with guidelines and laws were sufficiently operational to see the success of the program in salvaging both American lives and property. The structure of the organization that FEMA embraced also came under heavy fire as people questioned whether the model that it took was a stumbling block in its functional execution, consequently exacerbating the already direful situation in New Orleans or whether it supplemented in the process of the organizations ability, thus enhancing its functioning.
    FEMAs ability to back by supplementing state emergency management and to anticipate for the governments response as well as restoration in a disaster with the magnitude of Katrina were immensely lacking. The hardships experienced as a result of FEMAs ineptitude with regard to its grant programs, its personnel, skill entrenchment programs, disaster preparedness programs and integration of previously recommended programs agitate for a reformulation of its organizational framework as well as policy formulation. As its expected role in availing grants to the various states in the union as well as pre-empting natural disasters has been weakened, new policies need to be formulated to address the current trends as the policies in place are backdated. This will improve its ability in disaster response situations and contain its correlation with the states and the personnel charged with first response.
    The first recommendation would be that FEMAs Director together with his companion in the Office of Operations Coordination clearly and openly state and describe the federal governments National Response plan. As such, the two directors should draw up an operational framework formulating the systems substructures that are to be charged with specific level dissemination of information to make the whole disaster response program a coordinated effort with a singularity in the finality of its function. The information should arise from a single point and effectively and efficiently flow down to the intended systems by way of a well established information dissemination in the system. This will eliminate multiplication of information within the system as well as alleviate contradiction as a result of information coming out of various sections ranging from HSOC (Homeland Security Operations Center as well as IIMG (Inter-Agency Incident Management Group), (Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 2005).
    FEMAs Director in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary for Policy should clearly state the functions of the Principal Federal Official together with the federal governments officer in charge of coordination. In addition to these principle officers, the function of the Federal Resource Coordinator together with those of the manager in charge of recovery should be exemplified and particularized. This will provide a framework that clearly underlines the respective officers circle of operation with regard to disaster response activities and practices. If these organizational restructuring is undertaken, it will eliminate conflict of roles that often results into delayed action much to the demise of the victims on the ground as the officers charged with salvaging them from their direful circumstances are often confused as a result of the unnecessary division (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2005). Additionally it would be helpful in circumstances and given specific scenarios that warrant modification of roles. The restructuring will formulate a comprehensive framework upon which the role modification is based resolving conflict. This will be as a result of the given frameworks timetabling of the appropriate time for activation of given roles. The respective officers will be trained in adequate time so as to act with utmost speed in time of disasters.   
    The Department of Homeland Securitys chief officer in charge of operations as well as coordination together with the Chief Information Officer should formulate a framework for managing information that allows fast and accessible flow of information. This formulated management plan should be able to enable the victims on the ground directly and indirectly affected by the disaster, to trace and distribute adequate and reliable information among themselves through reliable and efficient established systems. The established information management center should be standard so as to allow the information being relayed in varied areas affected by the disaster is the same alleviating instances of contradictory messages that are likely to incite panic among the victims (Department ff Homeland Security, 2006).
FEMAs Director should establish Emergency Support Function Six (ESF-6) which should constitute of a team of emergency skilled personnel. This group should come up with a working plan that primarily exemplifies the key tasks that each agency within FEMA is charged with. In addition, the working group should formulate an operational framework clearly stating the nature of procedures to be executed in given scenarios. As such the disaster management team will be sent into the field knowing specifically what is expected of them and not engage in solving the ensuing crisis in a haphazard manner that is primarily pointless without specific defined goals. The plan that the team comes up with should clearly delineate response characteristic practices that span through the whole range disasters levels. This will eliminate occurrences where response mechanisms are not in tandem with the ensuing disaster. As such equipment, machinery and other aids, will consequently match the ensuing disaster adequately living to the challenges that it presents.
One reality that stems out of disasters of the rampaging Katrina and Rita is that the magnitude of its damage will never be estimated for a fact. This is as a result of the immense reckless havoc that the two mighty storms left the Gulf Coast with. Despite this fact, efforts should be made to salvage whatever can be ascertained that forms the property of the residents of the gulf coast as engendered in the long-term recovery effort of FEMA. As such, the emergency manager in efforts endeared towards the long-term recovery process on the Gulf coast should focus maximum priority on assessing of new methodologies as well as technology that could ascertain the extent of the damage. In addition to the damage, the formulated methodologies and technological innovation should address issues regarding occupancy and ownership. This is because of the failure of traditional methods to ascertain the extent of damage together with their incapability to resolve issues regarding occupancy and ownership. This methods as well as the applied technological instrumentation must be tested through feasibility studies that sufficiently pass the test of their viability through an open, transparent and accountable process. This will ensure that that the tendered equipment is able to meet their intended program requirements.
    FEMAs Director together with the Under Secretary for Preparedness collaborate their effort that will see interlinking between the process that encompass purposeful and efficient swift reaction to disaster. As such, the two should come up with an implementation plan that embraces continuity between preparedness, which primarily is the initial response and response. As such, the preparedness face of disaster management should make sure that all adequate measures are taken into account that could salvage property and ascertain the extent of loss. Much in the same way, the response should be swift, coordinated and efficient thus allowing the goals such as lives and property to be met. Finally the continuity should flow into the recovery face of disaster management. Ensuring that this process is not broken up into segment parts allows established trends to be followed and thus the outcome of such efforts is tentative enough to reflect an almost complete picture of the initial conditions. For this process to be successful it needs the policy of engagement of all stakeholders that sufficiently provide the management and recovery process adequate skills and knowledge. This calls for the directors relationship with the emergency management agencies that are found in the victim state. This state agencies play a crucial role as they have an on the ground knowledge of the disaster area and they bring in the critical element of primary knowledge. The management agencies also supply the directorate at the national level the various methodologies and designs that are employed when administering grants. Adhering to the states established models eliminates controversies as the resident victims might receive the new model by the directorate with an eye of suspicion (Department ff Homeland Security, 2005). The continuity also enhances harmony in the directorates planning as well as training and technical assistance together with other exercises.
    The emergency manager in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Policy, in the long-term recovery process on the Gulf Coast should establish assessable qualitative as well as quantitative standards for the expected recovery outcomes. In addition they should also provide the critical financial assistance. This will ensure that the quality of the recovery process is not compromised as a result of meagre resources that do not provide the necessary means towards tentatively ascertaining the level and extent of the damage. Moreover the coordinated effort between the manager and the Assistant Secretary for Policy should provide for the necessary technical needs. This call for hiring of efficient technical support in form of sophisticated machinery made possible by the funding that the two principles ensure is provide. The sophisticated technology is able to ascertain the level and extent of the damage in the recovery process. More importantly the two principles should also ensure that they have adequate and efficient staff members that are able to oversee the implementation of the formulated plans engendered in the recovery process. 
    September 11, terrorist attacks though unnatural, realigned the Federal Governments formulated framework of response to natural disasters. Government legislation primarily the Act of 2002 regarding homeland security that created the Department of Homeland Security reshaped FEMA, a formerly autonomous body (Public Law 107296 2002). As a result FEMA was somewhat empowered with the supplementary help of additional bodies offering new and critical services such as National Disaster Medical System but lost very critical arms such as the arm that was charged with the selection and assessment of grant benefactors. This underlines the extent of the disorganization that is engendered in the system. This calls for swift action in its policy as well as organizational restructuring.  

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