Political Science

The political influence was the central factor determining the Middle East nations decisions regarding the 1967 six-day conflict. The war, which saw the undecided Israel emerge victorious, was fought between Israel and its Arabian neighbors including Jordan, Egypt and Syria (Khouri 1985 37). Other Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq and Algeria, supported the war, as they provided reinforcement to troops and ammunition. Initially, there had been a number of border conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors with the Arab nations seeking to expel the Jews (Israel) from their land (George 198012). Specifically in Syria, Gamal Nasser, the then president of Egypt had expelled the Sinai Peninsula-based United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) in May 1967, which had been in operation there since the 1957s Suez crisis. Egypt had initiated the war after its troops closed the Straights of Tiran and, thus, blocked Israels supply route, through which Israeli ships brought supplies from the U.S. Following this, Israel amassed its IDF forces and on the 5th of June 1967 launched a preemptive offensive on Egypt. With many Arab nations terming Israels counterattack on Egypt as unwarranted, they began to attack Israel and the battle soon turned out of be balance of power in the region. On May 30th, Jordan had signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, which prompted it to attack Netanya and Jerusalem on receiving the Soviets propaganda that Israel was preparing to attack it (Yosh 1967 304). The aftermath of the war has had great impact on the geopolitics of this region to date. Israel managed to gain control over Gaza strip, Sinai Peninsula, Golan heights, East Jerusalem and West bank.

Israel had consistently sought to hold peaceful negotiations with the Arab neighbors, but to no success. The Arab neighbors, instead, aimed at Israels destruction rather than peace. For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had been initiated to intensify the focus of the Arab leagues efforts towards the destruction of Israel. The movement was formed through the initiative of the presidents and other leaders of the Arab nations and it was based on the Palestinian National Charter, which advocated for the destruction of Israel (Gainsborough 1986128). On the 10th of October 1960, Israels foreign minister, Golda Meir, had in a UN general assembly, called onto the Arab nations leaders to engage the Israels prime minister in the dialogue, so as to find a resolution to the existing conflict between Israel and these Arab nations. Instead, these nations turned down the offer feeling that Israel was an imposter in their land. Egypts Nasser claimed that the offer was an Israels move to mask the worlds opinion (George 198024). In a bid to uphold the PLOs policy, these Arab nations prompted Israel also to adopt different policies, in which the presidents personality immensely influenced Israels decision regarding the war. In one occasion Nasser, perceived as the most influential in the Arab world stated the Arab leagues goal as being, the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The immediate aim perfection of Arab military might. The national aim the eradication of Israel (Draper 198678).

The PLO initiated the attacks since its inception and by the time the war was fought it had launched about a hundred offensives against Israel. PLO attacks came despite Egypts and Jordans speculation that such attacks might lead to a major war.  The war was enhanced by political aspirations between the warring countries and other supporters, such as the Soviet Union, which aimed at destabilizing the Middle East (Khouri 198567).  Following the Soviet Unions fabrication to destroy the stability in the Middle East, Nasser introduced troops to the UNEFs base after he had expelled the emergency forces from the Sinai base. This was a violation of the principles under the conditional return of Sinai to the Egyptian government. Sinai had been retuned to Egypt on condition that UNEF forces would be deployed to the region to prevent any further encroachment of Egypt on the Straits of Tiran or launching offensives from the region (Wagner 1974). This made Israels leadership, though undecided on the issue to pass major decisions, to launch counter offensive to the Arab nations as a proactive move to defend themselves having suspected the possibility of an attack by the Arab countries (Yosh 1968320). The PLO sought to infiltrate Israeli people from Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza strip and it was controlled from Damascus and Cairo, through which Nasser sought to pass a message of ineffectiveness of Jordans king Hussein and eliminate the Israelis. On the other hand, King Hussein noted the PLO as a challenge to his power, both directly ad indirectly. It was clear to him that the PLO with Nasser directives might overthrow him or that PLOs activities could prompt Israel to counter attack Jordan and thus weaken his regime (Wagner 197489).  
       
The Fatah movement had been recently established at the time the war started, and through its leader Yasser Arafat termed the Israels water diversion plan, in which Israel sought to divert water from the Galilee Sea for irrigation in South and Eastern Israel. The Arabs perceived this to be an imperialist event (Draper 196879). Though the plan had been approved by the Arab engineers, the governments of Egypt declined to cooperate due to the recognition of Israel by both the U.N. and the Arab engineers. Arafat had, thus, incited the Arab nations to eliminate Israel as he considered the diversion plans as a catalyst to Israels revolution. Following these attacks the IDF officials called for the civil authority to declare the state of emergency as they perceived the possibility of an attack. Israels army, though, was not well organized in readiness for an offensive and this deterred the promptness of Israel to attack. The political arena responded differently to the pressures to call for war. Israels prime minister was not eager to respond as appropriately and declare war, while Abba Eban, the foreign minister, was not in favor of a unilateral move, since he perceived that war would be in contrast of the United Nations proposal (Brecher  Benjamin 1980103). There lacked a common ground in the issue regarding Israels going to war with the Arab nations. According to Ariel Sharon, this almost prompted a coup, in which the government officials opposing Israels move into war would be locked up as the army progressed into war. Pressure for war caused feelings that massive deaths of Israelis could take place. It was clear that the Israeli government was not interested in war as most feared of the aftermath, while others were just undecided. Israels prime minister had prior to the war called upon the Arab nations to make an agreement on peace.  Differences regarding war had initiated blame game, in which law makers such as Guroin blamed Staff Chief Rabin for comments he believed sparked the conflict that put Israel at conflict with the Arab neighbors (Amos 197997). Levi Eshkol, Israels prime minister, on the other hand, was reluctant concerning the issue at hand and this there seemed to be no solid decision making body to dictate the way forward for Israel to take.

Ben-Gurion was the Rafi (the Israel Non-Partisans and Workers List) leader and a Knesset member. He was the founder of Rafi, which drew its membership from the different ranks of labor. Gurion had an enormous influence among the Israeli public and the political arena, having strong ties with leading political figures of the opposing political parties. He had strongly opposed Levi Eshkol, who succeeded him as prime minister regarding the fate of the Lavon Affair, in which Israelis detectives in Egypt are believed to have been betrayed by a political personality. Bens association with the opposition would later incite it to be assertive in demanding that the government take action and make a major decision regarding the threat posed by the Arab opponents (Wagner 1974104). The oppositions pressure led to the formation of a unity government. Abba Eban had though without success, sought the reopening of the Straits of Tiran by the U.S which was the sole supply route through which Israel obtained supplies from the U.S. President Johnson guaranteed an international flotilla, though he failed to influence the international community to the aid of Israel and then retreated form his offer letting Israel making its independent decisions regarding the war (Brecher  Benjamin 1980). The U.S. had cautioned Israel against going to war alone and this represented an even more conflicting situation as there was no political goodwill to the war. The political arena was divided on the issued with most notable people such as the defense minister Moshe Dayan, being doubtful while others was completely opposed to the idea of war (Wagner 1974105). The UN was also against the war and had in fact issue a cease fire immediately the war began. The indecisiveness of the prominent politicians continued to build up tension in Israel basing on the realization that Egypt was not ready to cease fire despite U.N. calls to do so.

The aftermath of the six-day war changed to a great extent the geopolitics of the region. It destabilized the perceived power balance in the region and established a new reality. Israel won though it Israel was outnumbered by the opponents in terms of personnel and arms. Nations such as Syria and Egypt had obtained the most modern technology form Russia which was responsible for the speculations that Israel was preparing for an attack. According got Ajami, the defeat of the Arab forces marked the end of the Pan-Arab initiative to wipe out Israel which was pioneered by Nasser and also marked the initiation of Islamic fundamentalism (Amos 1979121). This implied that the Arab League had failed to achieve its goal as had been put forward by Nasser when he expelled the UNEF forces in Sinai, he said that as of that day, there no longer existed an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence (Gainsborough 1986 133).

This also marked the beginning of the Palestinian aspirations as millions of Palestinians came under the control of Israels rule, this initiating another struggle between the Arabs and Israel regarding the fate of the Palestinians. It is indisputable that the 1967 war could have failed to happen, had there been no political self ambitions, which had been central to the issues regarding the war.