Political Science

According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2003), proponents of preventive war use numerous arguments to make their case, but their trump card is that charge that Saddams past behavior proves he is too reckless, relentless, and aggressive to be allowed to possess weapons of mass destruction. Saddams attempts to assert absolute control in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War threatened regional peace and stability. In the 1980s, Saddam attempted to nationalize US-controlled companies in Iraq. With US interests in the region threatened, the United States increased arms export to Iran  the aim was to contain Iraqi power in the region. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, threatening American positions in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Saddams aggressive policies in 2003 seemed to eclipse American power in the region. To preserve balance of interests, it would be therefore rational for the United States to launch a preventive war against Saddam Hussein. One problem with this argument is the context in which Saddams aggression is situated (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003 4). The belief that Saddams past behavior shows that he cannot be contained rests on distorted logic. Indeed, historical data shows that the US can contain Iraq effectively even if Saddam possesses weapons of mass destruction. The failure of the Bush administration to locate WMD in the country magnified this faulty reasoning. To this, the war in Iraq failed to justify itself within the bound of both international law and the concept of preventive war itself.

Historical data shows that Saddam Hussein could be deterred. During the Ira-Iraq War, the US was able to contain Iraqi ambitions by supplying arms to Iran. During the Gulf War, the US-led coalition forces decimated or captured a quarter million Iraq troops (Operation Desert Storm). Indeed, Saddams record in this regard is no worse than that of neighboring states such as Egypt or Israel. In addition, a careful look at Saddams two wars shows his behavior was far from reckless.

Suppose Saddam possesses WMD, still he could be deterred. Saddams record of chemical weapons use is deplorable. As such, if Saddam was a rational leader, he would immediately know that war with the United States was pointless  that the US could retaliate with WMD if Iraq ever decided to use these weapons first. In short, Saddam has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the United States.

It is clear that the authors assumed that Saddam was a rational leader. Note that the authors concluded that Saddam has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons against the United States because the latter could retaliate easily. This is a critical view of Saddams point of view. To the authors, Iraq did not declare war against the United States because Saddam viewed it as irrational. Indeed, note that it was the United States which opted to attack Iraq. It is therefore logical to argue that Saddam was indeed rational.

Even if Saddam was rational, he would not prevent the United States from launching a preventive war against Iraq because this event is beyond the rubric of personal viewpoint.