Political Science

Sundown Towns, by James Loewen, describes the historical, economic and social factors which created the phenomenon of towns all across America where African Americans and other minorities are shunned by the explicit or implicit message that they are not welcome after sundown. Minorities in these towns occupy an extremely small percentage of the population or, in some cases, none at all. Loewens title refers to an example of the message which caused this exodus or extermination of the minority populations NIGGER, DONT LET THE SUN SET ON YOU HERE. (Loewen 65)

The expression Sundown Town was coined to refer to a particular phenomenon of racial segregation which is responsible for all-white and nearly all-white towns across the U.S. Yet this information has largely flown under the radar of American youth, who are taught in history class that our nation has always been getting better, in everything from transportation to race relations. (24) This is an untruth, and Loewen argues that race relations have gotten progressively worse since the abolition of slavery, only starting to improve in the 1970s after the civil rights movement. He points out that in some ways, the North proceeded to treat African Americans worse than the South (36) after Reconstruction.  Between the years 1890 to roughly the 1970, racism was enjoying a great resurgence.  In 1856 the Dred Scott decision--which held that African Americans were regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect (20)became one of the pieces of bedrock upon which sundown towns were built. In 1896, in Plessy vs. Fergusen, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that segregation was legal, (33) which reinforced the already-entrenched view of African Americans as inferior beings. This black mark on U.S. history illustrates the extent to which race relations had disintegrated in this country, especially so between the years of 1890 to 1930.

Sundown towns boast of their all-white populations, although the means which they use to achieve that dubious distinction are the embodiment of hatred and prejudice--surely not something to be proud of. Some of the mechanisms for creating sundown towns are as follows through violence, where race-riots, lynching and ethnic cleanses (92) effectively served to either eliminate minority populations through murder, or by causing a mass fleeing of the persecuted population through threat, whereby the threat of violence, such as spectacle lynching (97), was used to send a message to the entire minority community that they were not wanted and by the influence of the Ku Klux Klan, whose presence was instrumental in driving the blacks away, (99). The Klan would draw thousands of supporters and galvanize those already inclined towards racism to act on these prejudices, giving whites a sense of power, and usually succeeding in unleashing anger and violence on the minority communities. Other methods of creating Sundown Towns are by ordinance, where (illegal) segregation laws were informally passed by the community to prohibit African Americans from being within the corporate limits of the town after sundown and to forbid selling or renting property to them (99) by government action, where municipalities drove out or kept out African Americans by formal policy, (103) and by freeze-out, where no specific act of violence or formal policy was required (106) to white-wash a town. Minorities were simply made unwelcome,(106) and jobs, real estate, services, common courtesy and county protection were suddenly withheld.

When I look to the census of my hometown, Los Altos Hills, California, for evidence of the Sundown phenomenon, I expect to find that our population makeup is similar that of a Sundown Town. When compared to the national averages for population breakdown, it is impossible to ignore the great disparity between the average ratio of blacks to whites, and the average in my town. Los Altos Hills total population is 7,902, of which 5,922 (75) are identified as white, and 47 (.6) are identified as black. There are 2,572 owner-occupied dwellings, which account for 93.9 of the population, and there are 168 renter-occupied dwellings, which account for 6.1 of the population. 52 families (2.2) are listed as below the poverty level, and 311 individuals (3.9) are listed as below the poverty level. The national averages are as follows Whites average 74.3 of the population, and African Americans average 12.3. While I have never heard of any outright racism in my town, although my schools were nearly all-white, and I rarely saw black people in my neighborhood, I never thought much about race while I was growing up. Yet perhaps that is because I never had to--when there is only one color, one tends not to think about other colors. It never occurred to me that minorities had probably been on the receiving end of segregation, violence, ordinances, and freeze-outs such that they moved elsewhere. I never believed that blacks were not welcome in my town, but perhaps the fact that there were hardly any blacks was all the proof that I needed. People--at least i myself--do not go where they are not wanted.

Judging from the census data, I would say that it is likely that the 47 blacks who live in my town are renters, not owners. I would not want to own property in an area which is filled with persons who are completely different from me. And perhaps therein lies some of my prejudice I assume that blacks are completely different from me. Perhaps the deadliest element of the sundown phenomenon is that it inculcates the feeling of difference, so that before there is prejudice or racism, there is the innate understanding of otherness. And otherness is usually perceived as initially scary, since it is a threat to what is known, to sameness, to the safety of the known. I was unaware of my internal prejudice until I started to examine this subject. Were I to hypothesize, I would say that my town became a sundown town due to freeze-outs and unwritten law (aka official government action condoned by our town officials). Our town has a large real estate and rental and leasing industry, and it occurs to me that perhaps this is indicative of the fact that individuals do not trust blacks  Since we are in California, there is close proximity to the technology industry, which is notoriously white. Perhaps there was a hiring freeze on minorities in my town, although this is but a conjecture.

I assumed that the census data for Harlem, in NYC, would be the opposite of my town. I was correct there are approximately 2,626 whites (8.6) in Harlem, and 22,612 African Americans (74.4). It seems that this is one of the destinations African Americans retreated to after other areas carried out successful Sundown Town campaigns.  The other town I was curious to learn more about was Albany, New York. I assumed that Albany would be racially integrated because it is the state capital, as well as where many of the government offices are located. I had heard that Albany is a very run-down city, and that there is a great deal of poverty. I was very surprised to learn that 83.2 (245,060 persons) of Albany is white, and 11.1 (32,624 persons) is black. And then I realized the source of my surprise. I was basing my expectations on the handful of times I had been in the largely-African American-employed Albany bus station, and on my few experience of walking around Albany late at night and feeling unsafe because it was an unknown place. My unconscious mind connected those two experiences because of an ingrained racism I have. What if the bus station had been all-white Would I still have made the connection that Albany is an all-white county Would I have felt safer at night, knowing that my own people were around I am ashamed to say that I am almost sure the answer is yes.

New census data is currently being collected, and I am curious as to whether the demographics of any of these areas will have changed. With the election of President Obama, I wonder whether former Sundown Towns are on their last legs. It has seemed to me, judging from my understanding that the Ku Klux Klan is the model for those who work for white supremacy, that white supremacy is closely linked to patriotism. This association is rendered incompatible now that we have a black president, so unless the Klan challenges the same electoral system which has until now put white men in the most powerful seat of America, they have no legs to stand on. Yet ignorance has always been a hallmark of racism, and racism knows no incompatibilities. The Klan may well think it completely reconcilable that they are patriotic, yet hate our president hatred is without logic, and operates from a primal fear for ones safety. Perhaps I am completely off base, but it seems that Sundown Towns do not operate on the premise that whites are fundamentally better and more worthy than blacksbut on the premise that blacks are capable of just the same generation of commerce, society and power as whites. Thus, the fear-based thinking goes, if blacks and whites co-exist, there is the chance that blacks will become more powerful and take over the town. This theory makes sense in small towns where there are few resources to go around, however it does not hold when translated to more successful and economically stable towns and cities. My answer to this is to assume that this fear is so deep that it is unconscious, and has been passed on over generations so that, regardless of ones wealth or social standing, there exists an illogical fear that everything can be taken away if racism is formally as well as informally, repealed. 

Sundown Towns was illuminating as well as disturbing, as all worthwhile sociological texts should be. It was challenging to my sense of self to acknowledge that the logic I naturally employed when making an educated guess was derived from an illogical and racist attitude. I am fortunate to be aware at a young age of the operations of my unconscious, so that I can be one less unwitting member of a sundown town, and possibly an instrument of change.

Communal conventions have always been an indispensable element of administrative performance in East Asia. Communal conventions successfully reflected the cultural specificity of Asian communities and were used by them to promote stability and sustained administrative order. Specific patterns of community and administrative development in East Asia varied across countries. China, Vietnam, and Japan all pursued different self-management paths. Yet, it would be fair to say that communal conventions in East Asia continue to reflect the dominant principles of self-management and self-government and represent a critical component of continuous cultural stability in rural regions.

Communal conventions are the sets of norms and standards, which Asian communities and administrative units follow and use as a successful tool of self-government. Communal conventions represent an effective link between the cultural and geographical specificity of rural territories and the laws and regulations created by the state. Communal conventions are a definitive feature of the administrative culture in East Asia (Doan 190), but the forms through which they operate are increasingly diverse. China had its first communal convention created long time ago the latter was called Huong toc and was represented by a set of conventions which the rural community in China had to observe (Doan 190). However, under the pressure of changeable trade and industrial practices, communal conventions in China gradually became obsolete and gave place to the regulations established by hamlets and guilds (Doan 190). The period between 1949 and the end of the Cultural Revolution in China was marked with the continuous transformation of the former guilds and hamlets into production brigades, and communal conventions in the form they had been accepted before went into oblivion. It was not before the end of the 1980s that China, for the second time in its history, came to recognize the relevance and significance of communal conventions as an effective tool of self-management and self-regulation (Doan 191). Today, communal conventions in China exemplify a unique form of integrating self-management with the basic principles of Chinese administrative culture communal conventions represent a regulatory framework for all rural communitys activities they are based on the peoples council, state policies and laws, defined by peoples congress, and executed by the peoples council itself (Doan 191). Communal conventions provide China with a unique opportunity to adjust standard administrative procedures to the specific needs of particular localities, and to meet the needs of hamlets and communities through effective self-management and decision-making.

China was, probably, the only country in East Asia to have temporarily sacrificed the benefits of communal conventions for the sake of the rules and regulations imposed by hamlets (Doan 191). In Japan, for example, communal conventions represent a long-standing cultural and administrative tradition, and even after the Meiji restoration, communal conventions in Japan were retained (Doan 191). The self-management mechanism in Japan is uniquely combined with the power of the village and or hamlet administration (Doan 191). In 1947, self-management and self-government in Japan were endorsed by the Japanese Diet (Doan 191). It goes without saying, that communal conventions in Japan, in China and in Vietnam reflect the cultural specificity of the region, for which they are created. In Japan, as well as in China, communal conventions are recognized by the state and communities use them to maintain the stability of the administrative order in their territories.

The situation is somewhat different in Vietnam, where the difference between laws and practices is more distinct, compared with Japan and China practices represent the category of ancestral customs that mirror peoples national culture with specific local and historical characteristics (Doan 193). Laws and practices are different in the power on which they rely while the former rely on the power of the state, the latter rest on the community traditions and customs (Doan 193). Communal conventions regularly change to reflect the non-static nature of administrative development in rural communities, but that they are often sketchy and are limited to cultural principles is a fact (Doan 194). Nevertheless, it is at least incorrect to say that communal conventions in Vietnam do not serve their administrative purpose in reality, communal conventions are institutionalized to the extent, which holds every household as a unit of execution and helps state authorities translate their regulations into reality of rural life (Doan 195). Hamlets and provinces successfully utilize communal conventions to self-manage their natural resources and to protect their territories from devastation, and provincial authorities are held responsible for coordinating and complying with the communal conventions (Doan 196-7). In the context of modern East Asia, communal conventions are important in several ways.

Communal conventions in East Asia have already turned into the most effective, widely acceptable, and universally recognized instrument of self-management. That communal conventions are universally recognized by rural communities means that the latter will follow and keep to the norms and principles imposed on them by provincial authorities and  or rural councils. Communal conventions serve an effective means of preserving and promoting cultural practices that are characteristic of different cultural regions in East Asia. Communal conventions help rural communities to preserve their cultural specificity and, simultaneously, support communities in their striving to meet their cultural, social, and administrative needs. Communal conventions are still the most effective link between rural communities and the word of law. Rural communities use communal conventions to protect their interests and to meet their cultural and social needs. At times, communal conventions seem to reside in the realms undefined by the law itself (Doan 197), but it is an erroneous perception. Rather, it is due to communal conventions that communities and states in East Asia were able to preserve their social stability and sustain their cultural successes in the long run.

Conclusion
Communal conventions in East Asia exemplify a unique link between the cultural specificity of the rural communities and the word of law. Communal conventions represent a long-standing tradition of self-government and self-management in East Asia. Specific patterns of administrative order vary across Asian communities Japan, China, and Vietnam all chose to pursue different administrative paths, but there is a universal perception that communal conventions regulate the areas undefined by the law. In reality, these are communal conventions that gave East Asia a unique opportunity to preserve the dominance of self-government principles as the key to continuous social stability.

Nationalism is a hard to define phenomenon. Manu experts have theorized that humans organized as societies from needs of physical security first, to which were later added religious and cultural affinities that served to further bind them together as a nation. The Westphalian construct transformed this concept of nation into a nation-state with fixed geographical boundaries wherein sovereignty of that nation-state became a prime driving factor for the rise of what is called as nationalism. This book report examines the book, For Kin or Country Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War by Stephen M. Saideman and William R Ayers to understand the authors take on the larger dynamics of nationalism and its linkages with other aspects of state to state relationships and internal societal interactions.

Saideman and Ayers begin their argument by stating that countries try and change boundaries through aggressive means to reunite lost kin which is known as irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 1). Irredentism leading to territorial claims based on ethnic ties is one of the ways in which political leaders try and generate nationalistic feelings amongst their populace. This tactic is generally a negative approach where resort to war is the most likely outcome leading to widespread destruction and loss of life. Why some states such as Armenia, Croatia and Serbia adopted an inherently risky course of action with its obvious disadvantages is a question that the authors try to explain in this book. The author also analyze why other states such as Hungary, Romania and Russia have not have not resorted to irredentist wars to further their national interests to provide a holistic understanding of the phenomenon. The authors theorize that the course of action that a country adopts largely depends upon that countrys domestic politics and its interplay with foreign policy issues. Here the authors claim that domestic politics more often than not have resorted to xenophobia, the fear or hatred of all things foreign to act as a rallying force. The belief that hatred may actually produce peace (Saideman and Ayres 2) is considered as a viable option by political leaders using xenophobia for their own gains. The authors argue that it is important to study irredentism because practically such a policy can be extremely destructive and that it has broader political implications (Saideman and Ayres 3).  According to the authors, irredentism was the prime factor that led to the First and Second World Wars and that fascism was built on irredentist ideology. Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the Bosnian war all are unsuccessful examples of instability created by irredentism while Armenia stands out as a successful example of irredentism having won the war against Azerbaijan to establish a de facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh (Saideman and Ayres 5).  Pakistani irredentism is one of the factors for the continued stand-off between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region. Here, the Pakistanis claim that Kashmir, a Muslim dominated province rightfully belongs to Pakistan because of shared religious identity. Similarly, the fear of greater Afghanistan comprising of dominant Pakhtuns of Afghanistan and large parts of Pakistan is a source of irredentist tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the theoretical level, the authors claim that irredentism challenges commonly held concepts of deterrence. Irredentism is also an excuse to divert domestic attention away from the leaderships domestic follies. The authors hypothesis concentrates on the question that domestic politics and the complex of interactions between the mother state and its ethnic kin abroad drive irredentist decision (Saideman and Ayres 8). This could help scholars understand why some states resort to such policies and others do not. The authors also examine whether economic interdependence lessens the chances of irredentism. The authors also pursue the theme that their study helps counterbalance the widely held notion that international organizations constrain national foreign policies. The authors use both rationalist and constructivist principles in parts to examine the issues of irredentism. The authors have also striven to contribute to the study of comparative politics on minority rights in new democracies and their appeal to kin abroad. By coursing through such a track, the authors then try to explain what national identity means arriving at the final conclusion that irredentism causes war and what are the conditions that lead to war. 

To explain the reason why countries resort to irredentist policies even if the costs calculated may be extravagant, the authors take a few assumptions. Their first assumption is that the political leadership prefers to use all means necessary to remain in power than worry about the effects of their irredentist policies on their kin or the country. Power at all costs is the possible driving factor in such cases. Their second assumption revolves on the composition of the domestic audience and the type of political system where irredentism may be required. The authors contend that irredentism is far more likely if the lost territories are inhabited by ethnic brethren who are relevant politically in the homeland (Saideman and Ayres 23) and how the kin are being treated by the occupying country. The authors then examine the approaches adopted by other political theorists how international organizations constrain irredentist behavior.  They outline the views of other political theorist largely supporting the belief that the NATO and the EU have had a strong moderating influence in reducing irredentism in the continent.
The authors examine Croatia and Serbia in detail to arrive at some conclusions on the importance of irredentism in determining a nations future trajectory. In the case of both the countries, the effort was to create a Greater Serbia uniting all Serbs and Greater Croatia for all Croats (Saideman and Ayres 52) in the erstwhile Yugoslavia. These actions led to a direct clash of interest as large sets of each ethnic group lived in the other country and its surrounding provinces. The result was a horrific chain reaction of ethnic cleansing in a First World setting. The important finding in the case of Serbia and Croatia was that not only the irredentist approach of the leaders was strident and well planned, but the domestic audience too whole heartedly believed in this brand of ethno-centrism. Since such sentiments of ethnic exclusivity ran so high, ethnic cleansing was a natural corollary where even the overwhelming presence of the NATO was not a sufficient leverage to constrain the irredentist behavior.

In the case of Armenia, the position taken by the Armenians that they would never surrender under any circumstances (Saideman and Ayres 78) their predominantly Christian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh because it was a holy duty to support their kin who were unjustly clubbed with Muslim Azerbaijan. The war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh was won by the Armenians because the feeling of kinship and kinship identity amongst the Nagorno-Karabakh residents ran high and they, any case, formed the majority population. In this case, both the political resolve and the resolve of the target populace matched making it easier for Armenian leadership to press home their de facto victory over the Azerbaijanis. According to the authors, the image of martyrdom, the belief in antiquity and the relationship to territory (Saideman and Ayres 94) have been the three key factors for the success of Armenian irredentist policies in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Hungarian example according to the authors provides a good reasoning why irredentism was not resorted to by the state. In this case the state decided to use international norms such as bilateral treaties with neighbors to resolve boundary issues and in return sought assurances of good treatment of the Hungarian minorities (Saideman and Ayres 115). Thereafter Hungary has not resorted to aggression, which the authors point supports the argument that boundary norms can constrain irredentist behavior (Saideman and Ayres 131).  Similar situation was found to exist in the case of Romania (Saideman and Ayres 166) and thus the hypothesis that interstate boundaries limit irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 197) is a truism. As a corollary, the authors claim that irredentism occurs across intrastate boundaries as was the case with the former Soviet Union.  However, once the Soviet Union broke up, Russia has not resorted to aggressive irredentism with regards to its Russian kin in the former Soviet republic. Even in the case of Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war, in Chechnya, and to a lesser extent in Moldova and Georgia (Saideman and Ayres 181), the considerations were different. Russian nationalism, it seems played very little part in these Russian interventions. Here the authors reflect on power politics and the dominance of Russia over its former republics as being sufficient guarantor for Russia not to indulge in irredentist policies. 

International norms and pressures have not been adequate tools to prevent irredentist conflicts. A case in point is the clash between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Pakistani irredentist wars with India over Kashmir. In both these cases the international community has not exerted adequate pressure (Saideman and Ayres 229). In the case of Cyprus, the geographical isolation of both the mother countries from the island makes strident irredentism more difficult. In fact, the authors call the Turkish support for self determination its kin in Cyprus quasi-irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 219) as Turkish internal domestic compulsions, and its quest for EU membership prevent it from going the whole hog on the Cypriot question. The authors theorize that geographical proximity to the target audience makes it easier for nation-states to employ irredentist policies. 

Having studied the histories of numerous European countries in detail and some Asian countries in brief, the authors provide an analysis of what could be the policy implications of the study of irredentism. The finding that Kin outside the country are close to the group inside but not always identical (Saideman and Ayres 241) provides policy makers with options to deal with violence or threat of war. The very fact that Ireland did not resort to irredentism over the Northern Ireland issue shows that despite being same kin and in proximate positions, the Irish identified differently with their Northern brethren. They took a pragmatic view of their relationship with Britain and also realized that those on the outside were too many to be easily absorbed into the Irish fold and that Ireland had more to lose if it followed the IRAs agenda. Irelands economic growth and it ties to the EU mattered more (Saideman and Ayres 211) than any foggy notions of independence for Northern Ireland.

The authors analysis of Pakistans Kashmir policy is faulty and not based on deep study of the complexities of the problem in the Indian Subcontinent. The authors contention that the Punjab province of Pakistan being closest to Kashmir has a shared blood relationship and feelings of kinship (Saideman and Ayres 223) is completely wrong. It shows that the authors have no knowledge of the ethnic make-up of the Punjabis and the Kashmiris. The Pakistani Punjabis are the feudal landlords and the ruling elite of Pakistan who have little real sympathy for the Kashmiri cause. This is borne out by the fact that even the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan has seen no development whatsoever despite being in possession of that region for over sixty years. The reasons for Pakistani aggressions lie much deeper. The genesis of Pakistans Kashmir view lies in its two-nation theory which posits that Muslims of the Indian subcontinent cannot co-exist in the same country as Hindus and therefore require a separate state. This theory led to the partition of India but did not lead to all Muslims of independent India moving to Pakistan. In fact, to the chagrin of the Pakistani leaders, a large population stayed back and today India has the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia with Pakistan coming third. In the Kashmir region Muslim domination is only in the Kashmir valley with Jammu being predominantly Hindu and Ladakh predominantly Buddhist. Even amongst the valley Muslims, the predominant mood is independence from both India and Pakistan. Pakistans Kashmir policy has less to do with any irredentism and more to the ideological incompatibility that Kashmir represents. Its continuance as an Indian province strikes at the very heart of the idea of Pakistan and hence the single-minded pursuit of the ruling elite to wrest it from Indian control.   The authors though later on in the book hit upon the right reason for the so-called irredentism when they state that Pakistani leaders need to develop a cohesive national identity focused on something more than antipathy to India and nursing off old wounds (Saideman and Ayres 227).

Another important region the authors completely neglect is the Middle East. It is obvious that their theory of irredentism does not apply to the Middle East because after two bouts of irredentist Arab-Israeli wars, the Arabs have generally desisted from taking on Israel for the real and perceived mistreatment of its kin, the Palestinians. Obviously, realism, power politics, the military might of Israel and the unstinted support of America to Israel are reasons sufficient to dissuade Arab states from embarking upon irredentism. This is an angle that has not been sufficiently developed by the authors. The authors have only once discussed realism while explaining Russian behavior as to why they have not resorted to irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 178) even when all the possible factors existed in the erstwhile soviet republics.   

The book is important because it provides a dissenting view to some popularly held beliefs. One such belief is that ethno-nationalism is always violent and that minorities are always treated with disdain by the majority. Contrary to popular belief that xenophobia usually leads to war, the authors offer that xenophobia has in fact helped stop a number state to state conflicts that could have taken place after the fall of the Soviet Union. Irredentism in Post Soviet Union Europe did not happen on a wide scale but was only limited to a few countries like Serbia, Croatia and Armenia. The authors findings point out that nationalistic content mattered more than irredentism especially in multi-ethnic empires such as Hungary and Russia where both the Hungarians and the Russians were used to living in far flung areas and had not been really affected when their empires broke down. Even in their far flung homes away from mother country, Hungarians and Russians lived in relative prosperity without really suffering inequities in the hands of the new majority. When the Soviet Union broke up, Russian xenophobia was more concerned with the enemy within rather than imaginary or real plight of their kin in the erstwhile Soviet republics.

In contrast, Armenian irredentism was due to their relative inexperience of having ruled as an independent state, the preponderance of homogeneity in its populace. Also, Armenian Diaspora held prominent positions in the Azerbaijan government, where they tended to highlight the plight of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Irredentism in post-Soviet Europe was also muted by xenophobic fear of immigrants swamping the prosperous neighbors. Thus a territory full of poor ethnicity belonging to an erstwhile Soviet republic was better given off rather than shoulder the burden themselves.  This finding has important policy implications.   

The authors findings are quite succinctly put where they identify the relevance of borders in deciding irredentist behavior. This is largely true. Their next finding that democracies are more peaceful (Saideman and Ayres 227) sounds more like western triumphalism on the lines of Francis Fukuyamas End of History. Any political theorist can easily argue that democracies are far from peaceful. One just has to look at U.S. behavior from the end of the Second World War till to date where in the name of democracy the U.S. has assassinated world leaders, invaded countries, and killed thousands of innocent civilians in the Vietnam War, Iraq and other regions of the world for the sake of an ideology. This democratic triumphalism is perhaps the weakest part of Saideman and Ayress book.   The findings that membership of international organizations may not be enough to stop irredentism is largely correct as the example of Greece and Turkey, both being members of NATO still fighting over Cyprus shows.

Lack of relative power also does not explain Croat and Pakistani actions thereby correctly refuting deterrence theorists is in part a correct finding but the reasons for Pakistan do not lie in irredentism but in deeper problems of national identity. The finding that kinship is not a necessary ingredient for irredentist behavior has been convincingly argued by the authors.  Mother countries may or may not exhibit irredentist behavior on behalf of their oppressed kin is a truism. Thus irredentist behavior is more rooted in domestic political compulsions of the mother country is yet again convincingly argued by the authors which supports their main thesis.

In conclusion, it can be reiterated that Saideman and Ayres do break new grounds in explaining certain aspects of international relations that combines mainstream rationalist and constructive principles. The authors description of European geopolitics in terms of irredentism and the primacy of internal domestic compulsions are largely correct while they err considerably when applying the same theoretical principles to the Indian subcontinent where the reasons are much deeper than just irredentism. Overall, the book provides readers of IR and policy makers numerous options to formulate innovative approaches to future state-state relations.

The current healthcare debate in Congress has every side fighting to have their positions heard. President Barack Obama thinks his health care plan will help people without insurance receive much-needed access. Opponents argue that his plan will cost taxpayers too much and will not solve the problems of spiraling out-of-control health care expenses. Whichever side one subscribes to understands that there are other groups who believe in them. Those groups are called lobbyists, and their job is to convince lawmakers that they should vote for their position.

Millions of dollars have already been spent on lobbyists attempting to influence every politicians vote. They share their positions with millions of other people. Lobbyists represent all sides of the equationthe pharmaceutical companies who are looking at their bottom line business owners who watch their profit margins to make sure they can afford health care for their employees. The physicians, who must provide quality care to their patients and to the American people who are footing the bill. All of them have a vested interest in the well-being of the issue. How that plays out will be forthcoming when the final vote on universal healthcare is taken soon. (Smith, 2009)

Jim Smith wrote recently about the cost of healthcare, while a quarter of a trillion dollars was spent lobbying for (and against modifying) healthcare, tens of thousands of people died from lack of health insurance. (Smith, 2009) Smith contends that while legislators continue arguing over the merits of healthcare overhaul, there are many people who cannot afford a hospital trip because it costs too much. Worse, if the patients are a sick child, then they are being denied access to shots and vaccinations that would keep them healthy. The author contends that the loss of human lives are the real cost of this debate. (Smith, 2009)

Speaking of costs, companies who employ lobbyists have no trouble spending money for their side. According to the Center for Responsible Politics, almost 550 million was spent on healthcare issues and used more than 3,400 lobbyists in 2009. That represents a 50 million increase in the amount spend on lobbying in 2008. (Center for Responsible Politics, 2010) In fact, the cost of healthcare has risen every year since 1998 (CRP, 2009). 

A recent article by Michael Beckel sustains this issue. The number of clients working to defeat the comprehensive healthcare legislation grew to more than 1,500 lobbyists in 2009. (Beckel, 2010) That figure is more than 100 lobbyists registered in the year before (2008). What that means is more companies are gearing up to block President Obamas healthcare initiative for fear it will negatively affect their own businesses. (Beckel, 2010)

The companies lobbying on the bill are as diverse as the issue itself. Drug and pharmaceutical companies are at the top of the list. Companies ranging from American Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) to the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) have poured in hundreds of thousands of dollars on behalf of the proposal. The latter group is concerned about the costs of prescription medications for its members and access to doctors visits and hospital stays (for either inpatient or outpatient services). (Beckel, 2010) The latter group not only uses its lobbyists to influence elected officials but its millions of members through letter-writing campaigns and telephone campaigns. The group tries to makes its case heard from their members point of view, as would other groups.

Among the companies that also joined the fray include McDonalds, which spend nearly 500,000 on this issue last year. That was a significant jump from the previous year, when they spent more than 300K in 2008. One might not believe that the fast-food restaurant chain would enter this debate. However, with thousands of locations worldwide and millions of employees working for them, McDonalds has a real, vested interest in how this issue plays out in Washington, D.C. (Beckel, 2010)

Hewlett-Packard and Pfizer are other companies that were involved in the debate. The fact that a pharmaceutical company is on the list is unsurprising. The fact that other companies are joining the debate is because of the millions of uninsured people who are clinging to the decision made on Capitol Hill. Beckel said this means there are many sides to the issue and the lobbyists are being paid well to have their voices heard.

Pfizer has spoken out against the bill for several years. They do not feel that companies should be able to foot the entire bill for employee health care. They would rather see a health spending account where employees deposit a set amount from their checks into an account that employees can access for co-payments, office visits and medications for themselves and their family. (Edwards, 2009)

Health Care 4
That is interesting because while their lobbyists are fighting against changes to the system, their executives are set for their healthcare coverage. Pfizer offers its top executives healthcare coverage for two years should they receive pink slips. Employees are able to use COBRA if they are laid-off from their jobsat their own expense. In the Pfizer case, the company takes care of its management employees who are downsized. (Edwards, 2009)

That seems to conflict with their position of change. Why would you pay for one group and not for another It does not make sense because money is being allocated for healthcare. It sends the wrong message for the company to come out against health care changes that will help many people and then turn around and take care of a few management employees (similar to a golden parachute for executives or expensive buyouts). Pfizer wants to have it both ways, but it cannot because the money must come from somewhere. Are people are going to feel comfortable knowing that a few people are getting the majority of coverage while the masses are being denied coverage The answer is not going to be a happy one for the pharmaceutical giant.

President Obama wants a modest change to the overall status of healthcare in America. He asks companies to pay for a majority of the employees health care expenses while having workers absorb the rest. Lobbyists have been working on both sides to develop ways to sway votes in either direction. Those favoring the presidents proposal argue that having some change is better than the current plan, which is unacceptable. Opponents say the bill is too costly and will reduce jobs and access more than embrace the idea. (Woodward, 2010)

What has been mentioned so far is these groups are attempting to move the debate toward either side. Lobbyists have argued on both sides what they believe to be the truth. 

Pharmaceutical companies believe that people should pay their own way for health coverage workers and labor unions think it should be paid for by the companies that employ the workers. While the debate drives toward the final votes in Congress, groups on both sides of the issue are hammering out their side of the argument in hopes of getting the key votes needed for victory. (Woodward, 2010)

Doing so would mean a chance people without health insurance can see a doctor without first mortgaging their home. It means caring for a sick loved one without incurring the costly fees from insurance companies. That is what President Obama hopes to accomplish with his plan. Whether it comes to fruition remains to be seen.

What is known now is why the lobbyists are working hard on both sides. According to a recent Gallop Poll survey, more than 1,000 Americans surveyed were just as divided as the politicians are. Of those surveyed, 45 percent favored the Obama plan while 48 percent opposed it in its current form. (Gallop, 2010) Many people surveyed said they want to see a new version of the health care overhaul instead of the one being debated in Congress now. Respondents felt that people need health insurance now and the way it is conceived will not work. (Gallop, 2010)

While the need to help those without health insurance is great, the Gallop Poll numbers suggests a different reason for change. In the six month before, September 2009, 36 percent said that a health care bill should pass because too many people were uninsured. That number dropped to 28 percent in March. Conversely, the number of respondents who said there is a moral obligation to help those in need doubled during the same six-month period (6 percent in September 2009 compared with 12 percent in March 2010). This means more people would like to help others in need, but think there are better ways to do it than just overhauling the current system. (Gallop, 2010)

Those who are opposed to the presidents plan thought it would raise premiums for employees. Roughly 20 percent of those polled said this would be the case if the plan went through. The poll also noted that healthcare foes content the bill would not adequately address the issues surrounding the system. During the six-month period, 19 percent of those surveyed in March said they agreed with this statement, up from 10 percent in September. (Gallop, 2010)

So, whether you are in favor or oppose to the presidents idea to overhaul the health care system to make it accessible to most Americans depends on your point of view. Lobbyists have spent countless hours and resources (read money) to influence the members of the House and Senate for years in trying to get this legislation voted on. They have powerful cases on both sides and the lawmakers must listen to every storyfrom the medical institutions that cry poverty to the family that cannot afford prescription drugs for either themselves or their elderly parentsand decide what is in the best interest of the country.

There is no right or wrong answer on this topicjust what someone feels in their heart is the right thing to do. Gallop found that people wants to change the current healthcare system. They just have different ideas on how to fix the problem. That is where lobbyists can come in a try making sense of the issue for their side. The hope is the legislature will take the time to get it done right so that the people can prosper without wondering if they can afford to see their physician.

In his book, Wheeler undertakes an assessment of the situational changes that the humanitarian intervention environment and the global contribution it achieves. He underscores the basis for legitimizing humanitarian intervention and further responds to skeptics who believe that humanitarian intervention is basically a tool for power politics that powerful nations use to achieve their geopolitical pursuits. He uses the case studies of Indias invasion of East Pakistan (1971), Tanzanias use of force in Uganda (1979) and the Vietnams overthrow of Pol pot regime of Cambodia in 1979. He cites the reluctance of the UN Security Council to pursue legitimacy aspect of humanitarian intervention up until the end of the second world and subsequently the Iraq, Somalia and Bosnian interventions (Wheeler, 2002). Through his article the concerns of the constructivist internationals relation scholars is adequately addressed by expounding on the understanding of the international norms and their development. He mainly advances the concept of international society rather than the realists belief that concentration of power is the international relations defining force or the utopian demands for revolution of the state based international systems (Wheeler, 2002). He rather takes the approach that state interaction patterns be embodied in rules that express common interests and values formulated through historical and contemporary processes study. 

His emphasis on a society build on a variety of states that are conscious of common interest and values binds them to rules that help them in relating to each other is enormous. He stresses the need of these state societies to intervene in cases where both state and non-state actors disregard international laws and thus put human survival in danger. Wheeler takes the English schools solidarism approach in dealing with the issue. In this approach, the international societys legitimacy in its commitment to justice is strengthened. It asserts that the society cannot let order and justice to remain locked in perennial tension but instead should look at possibilities of overcoming the conflict that resulted to the disorder (Wheeler, 2002). While I am obliged to agree that international society must be willing to formulate international laws and policies that allow intervention in cases of humanitarian situations that result from state actors, I disagree that intervention should be applied in general to non state actors. Instead international law should be legally binding to states to act on such non state causes of humanitarian crisis and only in such cases where the state fails to do so, should intervention of the international society be employed. However, state actors must not be allowed to move even an inch deep with their transgressions as the impacts of such has been witnessed historically.

The Rwandan genocide is a clear reflection of the impact of late intervention. While realist inclined international scholars have argued that international laws are not proper laws as they lack the authority that may not bind states, Wheeler argues otherwise and I agree (Wheeler, 2002). In his perspective Wheeler, views the law as the interlocking amidst power and authority. The cases cited in the book represent the success of intervention to save humanitarian crisis even where its in conflict with international. The book cites collapsed states where human rights violation had become an order of the day experience a great turn around upon intervention. The intervening states had to exercise both military and political power in its intervention (Wheeler, 2002). His assertion that instead of blanket condemnation of intervention acts, what is important is creation of a distinction between dominationforce based power and legitimate power based on moral principles, is rather in line with upholding of humanity (Wheeler, 2002).

Wheelers rejection of the international principles of sovereignty and non-intervention is indeed justified. It raises the question of whether moral principles should be ignored in a bid to steer by the international rules that allow human rights to be violated in the name of sovereignty and non-intervention policies.

The world international scholars must ask themselves questions from history could lives have been saved if Tanzania had not waited too long to intervene Could Rwandan crisis have turned to genocide if not for the long term blind eye the world gave it, in the name of international laws, what of Cambodia, Vietnam and other states Wheeler adequately addresses this situations and he says that,
I acknowledge that situations can arise where an alternative moral practice develops that secures approval but that breaks the existing law (Wheeler, 2002).

This perspective asserts that moral values far surpass international laws as they are the basis for formulation of the laws. There exist need therefore that international laws legalize intervention in cases of humanitarian emergency arise. A similar argument was previously put forth by Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodney that,
Unilateral humanitarian intervention belongs in the realm not of law but of moral choice (Wheeler, 2002).

A good example is the case of Kosovo. While the intervention that took place then, was illegal but then it held moral standing within the society. Wheelers acknowledgement that moral justification of an intervention that contravenes international law undermines the whole structure of international obligations broadens the perspective on the need for international law scholars to fine tune the international laws to cover existing universal moral obligations. Should one be allowed to kill another on the pretext of non-intervention law The answer is obviously no. the laws should be fine tuned to allow prevention of such acts within the society. However, wheelers blanket general provision for intervention has limitations. In cases where non-state actors engage in humanitarian abuses, international laws, rather than be quick to allow external intervention should provide time limit for the affected state to respond before allowing intervention. This would bar greedy and power hungry states from taking slight misdoing to their political and power quest advantage.

Wheeler recommends that state actions in reactions to humanitarian conditions should be constrained if they lack justification and plausible legitimate reasoning (Wheeler, 2002). He addresses the fear that state proclaimed humanitarian justifications may be insincere and bear selfish, motives but then he further asserts that the humanitarian justifications and results should provide the legal and moral justification for the actions (Wheeler, 2002). While it has been argued that both the Clinton and the Bush administration had applied humanitarian grounds to justify Kosovo intervention yet they bore ulterior motives, subsequently they had to address the humanitarian concerns that existed in the situation. The international laws should be structured to ensure that once a state invokes humanitarian grounds as its reason for intervention, it must be bound to abide by the humanitarian grounds it invoked.

In conclusion, its important to cite that Wheeler offers four requirements for humanitarian intervention, which are that there must exist a supreme humanitarian emergency, application of force and military might should always be the last resort, the force used be proportional to the situation and there must be a high probability that a positive humanitarian outcome. While I am in agreement with these four requirements, they need to incorporate some principles which allow intervention only in instances where the state in question is guilty of the humanitarian crisis or has displayed inability to avert the crisis. Additionally, a maximum time limit before intervention should be set taking regard of the intensity of the humanitarian crisis in question. Wheelers writing can therefore be conclusively regarded as a master piece that addresses key questions to future humanitarian interventions with regard to historical injustices to humanity. With a little fine tuning, the document is probably a complete guide to formulation of international laws on intervention on cases of humanitarian situations. Its no longer a question of how far a society can support the cause for minimum standard of humanity but how the society can achieve the highest respect for humanity from both state and non-state actors.

Morality can defined as a set of principles that are perceived by the society as virtuous. Morality can be viewed from three different angles, that is, normative, descriptive, and also from an ethical point of view (Wren, 1991, p.18). Morality, defined from its normative logic, refers to good or bad deeds, irrespective of what the society thinks. Basically, it is the perfect moral person in a given scenario.
Morality from its descriptive view refers to an individuals cultural standards, affiliations or social backgrounds that distinguish between good and bad in the human society. This definition is not objective rather, it only portrays what the society considers as either good or bad.

Morality from an ethical point of view refers to what combines the above two definitions and other definitions within a methodical philosophical approach of the ethical realm. Ethics tackle issues like how a moral result can be attained in a given scenario, how to determine moral standards, and so on (Leiter, 2002, p.78).

Political morality may be defined as a set of moral ideologies together with moral equality and how it is expressed by the state through equal treatment (Harris). Political morality, from the principle of universality viewpoint can be taken to mean that if a deed is good or bad to other people, it is good or bad for us. The most basic form of moral principles is that of universality, that is, if something is okay with one person, it is okay with another as well (Alasdair, 2005, p.240).

Utilitarianism is based on the suggestion that the moral value of an act is based exclusively with respect to its utility in providing happiness to mankind. Utilitarianism can be distinguished with the deontological philosophy, different   varieties of consequentialism, as well as with virtue ethics (Scarre, 2002, p.1).
The aim of this paper is to discuss political morality, utilitarianism and the question as to whether utilitarianism is an attractive theory of political morality.

Whether utilitarianism is an attractive principle to political theory is highly subjective, debatable, ambiguous and dependent on numerous factors.  These factors are made up of the main features of utilitarianism, the forms of utilitarianism, and on how utilitarianism is viewed by two significant personalities in relationship to this topic.

The two forms of utilitarianism are act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism
Act utilitarianism judges the right or wrong of an action in accordance with the consequences of the action in a given situation.  Thus, an act is good in a given situation if it amplifies the happiness of the certain people in that situation and it is bad if it does otherwise.

Rule utilitarianism is said to advocate for rules that if applied in some cases, may decrease happiness. For instance, not killing another human being is a good rule, but then it becomes quite tricky if it is applied as case in self defence. Advocates of rule utilitarianism argue that there are exceptional rules that permit the breach of other rules if breach of such rules would amount to happiness, a typical example being as mentioned, self-defence (West, 2004, p.74).

The main features of utilitarianism include
There is the principle of utility This feature focuses on maximizing good deeds and minimizing on the bad.

The theory of value This theory depicts the standard of goodness, based on happiness or pleasure, satisfaction of desires and goals, and the accomplishment of such conditions of affairs as independence, understanding, and various kinds of functioning, achievement, and deep personal relationships.

Consequentialism A deed is justifiably good or bad based on its outcome,
Impartiality One persons happiness is equally as good as the others and vice versa (Beuchamp  Bowie, 2004, p.17).

Jeremy Bentham, a philosopher, legal, and social reformer, was a significant figure with respect to utilitarianism, from his school of thought, he argued that the right deed was that which would bring the greatest joy for the greatest number of people, also referred to as the greatest happiness principle. He also recommended a technique of estimating the moral status of a deed, known as the hedonistic school of ethics. Benthams ideologies on legislation revolve around the principle of utility and how the tie into legislative practices. His theory of utility views good as that which creates the greatest amount of happiness, and minimizes pain and evil as that which creates the most pain without happiness (Bentham, 1890).

John Stuart Mills, another philosopher, also contributed considerably to the utilitarianism ideology. His famous philosophy of utilitarianism is referred to as the greatest-happiness principle. It states that one must act so as to create maximum pleasure for the maximum number of people, within reason. Mills key contribution to utilitarianism is his argument that happiness ought to be separated qualitatively. Whereas Bentham takes all forms of pleasure as equal, Mill is of the opinion that moral happiness is superior to physical forms of happiness. Mill claims that there is a difference between pleasure and contentment he claims that the former is of greater value than the latter. In addition, he distinguishes between the greater and lower forms of pleasure with the theory that those who experience both often have a preference over one than the other. This is parallel to Benthams school of thought (Mill, 1871).
As the discussion proceeds, it is imperative to get familiar with certain terminology with respect to this topic as highlighted next.

Hedonism  is derived from a Greek word hdonismos, which means happiness.  Basically hedonism points out that the only fundamental good is happiness. The different types of hedonism are motivational, egoistic and altruistic. Motivational hedonism stresses that only joy and suffering inspire people to either do or not do things. According to normative hedonism, it is only happiness and all forms of joy have value, whereas it is only pain and forms of pain that have no value. Egoistic hedonists are of the opinion that the happiness of a person is important, hence altruistic hedonists believe that the happiness of everyone is important (McLaughlin  Muncie, 2006).

Deontology is also a derivative of Greek words, deon and logos, that means the study of duty this school of thought. It is based on the concept that people have the obligation to abide by moral rules, irrespective of any positive consequences that can be derived from breaking them (Garett, 1996, p.23).
Advocates of deontology ethics are of the opinion that it is valuable to people since it offers them the opportunity to put the welfare of their families above others. They also deem it to be flexible as compared to consequentialism, which can support an individual to hurt their family if it would produce a positive outcome for others. Critics are of the opinion that deontological values can cause people to be degenerate and lack sympathy and that the school of thought is unfounded.

Virtue ethics is an approach to ethics which emphasizes the character of the moral agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking (Hursthouse, 1999, p.1).

Consequentialism, has already been pointed above as one of the aspects of utilitarianism.  It refers to those moral assumptions which argue that the consequences of a given action form the argument for any viable moral judgment with respect to that action.

The universality principle, is a principle that argues that a wrong or right  committed by one individual towards his people or country, is a wrong or right committed to all and sundry  irrespective of where one comes from.

Therefore, the terminologies highlighted above together with the features of utilitarianism will form the argument as to whether utilitarianism is an attractive theory with respect political morality or not.
The universality principle on political morality is based on the view that a deed committed against some people, irrespective of whether it is good or bad, applies to all. Thus, the argument formed is that the application of justice ought to be standard. Nevertheless, justice is what individuals perceive it to be, it is subjective. Therefore the question as to whether utilitarianism is a considerable theory when it comes to political morality is a matter of perception.  It largely depends on the school of thought from which it emanates. 

For instance, from a consequentialist school of thought, there are standards preceding morality, a consequentialist is of the belief that affliction and pain are bad things and that no one should experience them ( Darwall,2003, p.1). But conflict arises when morality is justified according to some of the standards applied to achieve (Kumises, 2006, p.3). Thus, from a consequentialist point of view, judgment on morality should be based purely on the consequences of an action the action applied in order to achieve a happy state of affairs in this case is totally irrelevant.

From a deontologists viewpoint, people are charged with the obligation of conforming by moral rules regardless of morality achieved from infringement of these rules. For instance, during war, it is morally unacceptable to murder innocent civilians as a result of bombing a military target, even if the act would result to eliminating an oppressive government. This school of thought totally opposes one of consequentialism (Darwall, 2003, p.3).
 
To interprate from the best consequences out of a particular action  to the moral action applied regardless of the consequences is not only confined within their respective school of thought  alone, but is also dependent to a large extent  on what lies within a persons discretion.What a majority find most attractive in the utilitarian theory is its simple form and rational nature. After all, it is only obvious that an individuals moral duty be aimed at opposing pain and endorsing happiness. To establish which precise deed is moral, all that someone needs to do is to establish that one deed which would create the maximum amount of joy and the minimum amount of pain (Mill, 1871).

Act-utilitarians, when deciding on the course of action to take, should reflect on only the consequences of their deeds they dont need to consult the modern theoretical social perception of morality, nor the confusing religious interpretations. The long and short of it, deeds are considered moral or immoral on a step by step basis with respect to the mount of happiness that particular deed will create in that specific situation.

A particular deed does not contain any inherent moral quality independent of its outcome in a particular circumstance. The consequences of an action alone are what gives it a moral worth and those consequences are all someone needs in evaluating to establish that significance and eventually, what course of action one will prefer to take.

Gone is the concept of the total moral rule the act-utilitarian does not need to consider what they think to be outdated, ill-supported, and intangible conceptions of ethical worth. For these reasons, act-utilitarianism continues to have a highly attractive feature to it. It seems the most fundamental moral principle that one ought to choose to uphold pleasure and prevent pain.

Morality must dictate that deeds consequential to moral duty eventually promote the social wellbeing. Pleasure would thus appear to be the ultimate stop point to morality given that the social wellbeing must include, and can perhaps be described exclusively as happiness.

Utilitarianism seems a unanimously generous theory of morality where self-destructive moral rules never exist. After all why would the society desire to support moral doctrines which dont have beneficial results except for the accomplishment of what frequently appear to be moral abstracts aimed more at superstition than reason Contemporary utilitarians more often than not deem anti-utilitarian moral concepts to be non-generous due to their deficiency in consideration of happiness and the general welfare (Bentham, 1890).

Though apparently an attractive theory, utilitarianism faces a lot of disapproval, as it seems to exaggerate the moral worth of pleasure while contradicting some of the societys most fundamental moral standards. Act-utilitarianism emphasize that in every situation, the moral thing to do is that deed which will maximize happiness. But arent there situations where people can experience pleasure as a consequence of immoral deeds, not simply one person or a small group of persons but the majority

Act-utilitarianism, when placed under scrutiny, often can give what the society by and large perceives of as the incorrect answer. Act-utilitarianism in its single-minded search of happiness, can more likely lead one to take no notice of basic human freedoms and basic moral concepts. It  is based on the view that the end justifies the means, and that any deed, irrespective of its non-utilitarian explanation, will be good so long as it supports the general happiness more than any other deed.

Is it not true that an action can find sense in itself, that it has its own inherent moral value which is independent of its expected results Consider now, the results themselves - what justifies the ends themselves our desire to seek those ends An action justifies itself because it has its own independent moral worth. Then it might it  be true  that a means may find meaning in itself other than from its ends that deeds can have their own inherent moral character.

In view of the above, the argument that utilitarianism can be deemed as an attractive theory with respect to political theory has its answer in both yes and no. Incidentally, it depends on the school of thought that one comes from. Additionally, it is a matter of rationality, for instance, a consequentialist would argue that it is common knowledge that in most cases one has to experience some pain to achieve happiness, better still joy. This totally justifies a consequentialists argument. But then, to attain joy irrespective of the actions behind it is totally irrational, more so if the actions behind the attained state of joy are detrimental and destructive to the joy and peace of others. Therefore, if utilitarianism is based on its consequentialism feature, then it is not an attractive theory to political morality.

But there is another twist to it, an interesting one. There is a possibility that aspect of consequentialism in utilitarianism can be watered down. According to Kants theory or Kantianism, individuals should do everything possible to bring out the best possible results. Kant emphasizes on the dignity of persons and consequentialism with its commendable view that, people should strive as much as possible to do what is good and righteous. Kants moral principle properly interpreted creates consequentialist normative principle. This is known Kantian consequentialism principle, with respect to the Kantian consequential principle, and then it is right to argue that utilitarianism is an attractive theory to political morality (Cummiskey, 1996, p.3).

Utilitarianism is based on several concepts pain, suffering, pleasure, utility happiness, consequentialism, and hedonism. Thus, the argument should be based on the above factors. But one can argue that consequentialism is an acceptable feature if and only if it is based on Kantialism and other positive factors. My point ultimately is that utilitarianism can be an attractive feature to political theory depending on ones school of thought. My emphasis is on the school of thought.

Historians are known for long to have been measuring the performance of American presidents by their policies implemented within the first 100 days of office. Although this performance evaluation technique has been in use in America for long, a debate on its reliability to predict the performance of the president in the remaining part of is term has been on the debate for long. Many a time history has proved it unreliable and again on the contrary, it has worked for same cases. Based on this technique, the historians have argued that Obama achievements within the first 100 days in office can be closely related to those of Franklin Roosevelt (Kroll, 2010). This is because they became president when America was facing great economical crisis and the American image to the international community was poor. Their biggest challenge was to reform the economy and save their people from the risks of poverty and unemployment. In this interest, this paper is written and gives the policies implemented by both Obama and FDR. It also highlights the reliability, of this method of evaluating performance, in predicting the long term performance as presidents. 

Within the first 100 day, Obamas presidency has been marked with great achievements top on the list being the implementation of the electronic medical record system. This was achieved by initiating a debate which saw through the allocation of more than 19 billion to the health care system. The establishment of this information technology system within the health sector was seen and welcomed by many Americans as a noble move made to restructure and upgrade the deteriorating health sector (Barnett, 2009).

Still cited as an achievement, is the approval of the 2,500 highway projects. This has been effective since the passage of the economic stimulus bill and has been welcome by the Americans in a two fold points of view. One it is expected to create more jobs for the unemployed and therefore eliminate the issue of unemployment in America which was making it no longer the land of opportunities and secondly facilitate good transport in the country which is a corner stone for their economy.

Another notable policy implemented within the first 100 days of office under the presidency of Obama was the 2,500 tax credit intended to offset education expenses for the poor people seeking college education. He initiated the policy to see that the treasury contributed effectively to the more than five million families who were burdened by debts in a more qualitative and quantitative manner. This can be described as a kick start to the education sector which was on the high risk of collapsing (Rollins, 2009). Education sector was one of the driving forces of the American economy and its deterioration subjected the Americans to the risks of lacking enough trained personnel to build and maintain their economy to their standards.

The automobile industry in America particularly the general motors company was in a critical state of failure. Obama facilitated the restructuring of the management and elimination of ineffective employment in this sector. He also established a frame work which will revive the Americans dominancy in car manufacturing. He has for instant initiated the allocation of 2 billion in the economic stimulus package to cater for the development of the advanced battery system which is made to reclaim the Americans lost share of the automobile industry market.

In international affairs, the president has initiated funding and diplomatic talks in the war tone countries. This has been highly appreciated by the international community and restored the lost glory and friendship with the international community. A notable example is the allocation of 5 billion in aid commitment to Pakistan to restructure their economy and fight terrorism in their country (McManus, 2009). In addition he has shaped the image of America by engaging with the Muslims world. Although this move was under appreciated by the conservative Americans, it cleared the doubts that America was not fighting the Muslim religion. 

More than any other president in the history of America, Obama has implemented policies which will facilitate the growth of Americans struggling cities. By creating an urban policy office in the white house, he declared his interest in helping the small cities grow to their best. It is believed that the biggest challenge, for the development of these cities is violence and crime. To eliminate this, some 2 billion were allocated through the recovery act to Byrne Grant which funds anti gang forces (Kroll, 2010).

On the issue of environment Obamas government did quite an appreciateble work within the first 100 days. One notable policy implemented on this sector was the putting under government protection more two million acres of forest, many miles of rivers and national parks. For the long trailing history of the American forestry, Osama initiated the signing of the omnibus public land management act which was intended to enhance the environment and world life conservation.

One of main policies implemented by Roosevelt was that aimed at restoring the agriculture sector. He is believed to have been very interested in farming and underscored the fact that the American economy could not be revived until the agriculture sector was prosperous. To enhance this, he initiated the establishment of the farm security act which was intended at increasing the income from the firms. This was achieved trough increasing the prices of the firm products by reducing the total output from the firms. Another act which was established to facilitate the growth of the agriculture sector was the agricultural adjustment act. This was established to put into the consideration the requirements of the big firm organization and reflect the commitment of his firm advisers (Barnett, 2009). The effeteness of this police was felt later when the prices increased significantly and remained high with the increase in output. This policy is believed to have had given a long and a reliable solution to the troubled agriculture sector.

Still to be cited here is the implementation of what is normally described as the repeal of prohibition. This policy was aimed at legalizing the production and selling of alcohol within America. By signing the bill, several states and cities gained more income from revenues and this contributed amicably to his popularity.

Another appreciateble policy implemented during the 100 days of Roosevelt of office was the groups of programs contained under the so called Puerto Rico. These programs were aimed at promoting land reforms and enhance development of small firms. It also foresaw the establishment of firm cooperatives and promoted industrial and agricultural diversification. Finally, Roosevelt is remembered predominantly for establishing long term plans made to prevent American economy from undergoing another depression. This included but not limited to business, labor and government structure (Rollins, 2009).

From the above discussion, it can be appreciated that both Obama and FDR had many similarities particularly in reforming the American economy which was depressed. They initiated the congress to pass bills and acted efficiently in signing them into laws as well as reinstalling the confidence of the people and giving them some hope of recovery of their economy. History has proved that the first 100 days judgment method does not hold true because President Roosevelts policies which reformed the country totally were implemented after the 100 days in office. A good example was the Glass Steagall act and the national industrial recovery acts were constituted on the 105th day of presidency.

Although the first 100 days of Roosevelt were not as significant as the rest of his term, they were very important in reflecting his economic philosophy and can be used as a yard stick to measure the presidents performance within an agreeable accuracy. The author of this essay appreciates the good work achieved by Obama in his first 100 days but if little to any other person, there is still hope and chance to outpace the past

In conclusion therefore, it is clear that there is no direct correlation between what the president accomplishes within the first 100 days and in the rest of his term. It can therefore be reflected that if Roosevelt was judged by his 100 days in office, he would have failed and therefore there are still hopes of Obama achieving more in his long term legacy. The similarities and differences can be derived directly from the above discussion.