Political Science

Nationalism is a hard to define phenomenon. Manu experts have theorized that humans organized as societies from needs of physical security first, to which were later added religious and cultural affinities that served to further bind them together as a nation. The Westphalian construct transformed this concept of nation into a nation-state with fixed geographical boundaries wherein sovereignty of that nation-state became a prime driving factor for the rise of what is called as nationalism. This book report examines the book, For Kin or Country Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War by Stephen M. Saideman and William R Ayers to understand the authors take on the larger dynamics of nationalism and its linkages with other aspects of state to state relationships and internal societal interactions.

Saideman and Ayers begin their argument by stating that countries try and change boundaries through aggressive means to reunite lost kin which is known as irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 1). Irredentism leading to territorial claims based on ethnic ties is one of the ways in which political leaders try and generate nationalistic feelings amongst their populace. This tactic is generally a negative approach where resort to war is the most likely outcome leading to widespread destruction and loss of life. Why some states such as Armenia, Croatia and Serbia adopted an inherently risky course of action with its obvious disadvantages is a question that the authors try to explain in this book. The author also analyze why other states such as Hungary, Romania and Russia have not have not resorted to irredentist wars to further their national interests to provide a holistic understanding of the phenomenon. The authors theorize that the course of action that a country adopts largely depends upon that countrys domestic politics and its interplay with foreign policy issues. Here the authors claim that domestic politics more often than not have resorted to xenophobia, the fear or hatred of all things foreign to act as a rallying force. The belief that hatred may actually produce peace (Saideman and Ayres 2) is considered as a viable option by political leaders using xenophobia for their own gains. The authors argue that it is important to study irredentism because practically such a policy can be extremely destructive and that it has broader political implications (Saideman and Ayres 3).  According to the authors, irredentism was the prime factor that led to the First and Second World Wars and that fascism was built on irredentist ideology. Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the Bosnian war all are unsuccessful examples of instability created by irredentism while Armenia stands out as a successful example of irredentism having won the war against Azerbaijan to establish a de facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh (Saideman and Ayres 5).  Pakistani irredentism is one of the factors for the continued stand-off between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region. Here, the Pakistanis claim that Kashmir, a Muslim dominated province rightfully belongs to Pakistan because of shared religious identity. Similarly, the fear of greater Afghanistan comprising of dominant Pakhtuns of Afghanistan and large parts of Pakistan is a source of irredentist tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the theoretical level, the authors claim that irredentism challenges commonly held concepts of deterrence. Irredentism is also an excuse to divert domestic attention away from the leaderships domestic follies. The authors hypothesis concentrates on the question that domestic politics and the complex of interactions between the mother state and its ethnic kin abroad drive irredentist decision (Saideman and Ayres 8). This could help scholars understand why some states resort to such policies and others do not. The authors also examine whether economic interdependence lessens the chances of irredentism. The authors also pursue the theme that their study helps counterbalance the widely held notion that international organizations constrain national foreign policies. The authors use both rationalist and constructivist principles in parts to examine the issues of irredentism. The authors have also striven to contribute to the study of comparative politics on minority rights in new democracies and their appeal to kin abroad. By coursing through such a track, the authors then try to explain what national identity means arriving at the final conclusion that irredentism causes war and what are the conditions that lead to war. 

To explain the reason why countries resort to irredentist policies even if the costs calculated may be extravagant, the authors take a few assumptions. Their first assumption is that the political leadership prefers to use all means necessary to remain in power than worry about the effects of their irredentist policies on their kin or the country. Power at all costs is the possible driving factor in such cases. Their second assumption revolves on the composition of the domestic audience and the type of political system where irredentism may be required. The authors contend that irredentism is far more likely if the lost territories are inhabited by ethnic brethren who are relevant politically in the homeland (Saideman and Ayres 23) and how the kin are being treated by the occupying country. The authors then examine the approaches adopted by other political theorists how international organizations constrain irredentist behavior.  They outline the views of other political theorist largely supporting the belief that the NATO and the EU have had a strong moderating influence in reducing irredentism in the continent.
The authors examine Croatia and Serbia in detail to arrive at some conclusions on the importance of irredentism in determining a nations future trajectory. In the case of both the countries, the effort was to create a Greater Serbia uniting all Serbs and Greater Croatia for all Croats (Saideman and Ayres 52) in the erstwhile Yugoslavia. These actions led to a direct clash of interest as large sets of each ethnic group lived in the other country and its surrounding provinces. The result was a horrific chain reaction of ethnic cleansing in a First World setting. The important finding in the case of Serbia and Croatia was that not only the irredentist approach of the leaders was strident and well planned, but the domestic audience too whole heartedly believed in this brand of ethno-centrism. Since such sentiments of ethnic exclusivity ran so high, ethnic cleansing was a natural corollary where even the overwhelming presence of the NATO was not a sufficient leverage to constrain the irredentist behavior.

In the case of Armenia, the position taken by the Armenians that they would never surrender under any circumstances (Saideman and Ayres 78) their predominantly Christian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh because it was a holy duty to support their kin who were unjustly clubbed with Muslim Azerbaijan. The war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh was won by the Armenians because the feeling of kinship and kinship identity amongst the Nagorno-Karabakh residents ran high and they, any case, formed the majority population. In this case, both the political resolve and the resolve of the target populace matched making it easier for Armenian leadership to press home their de facto victory over the Azerbaijanis. According to the authors, the image of martyrdom, the belief in antiquity and the relationship to territory (Saideman and Ayres 94) have been the three key factors for the success of Armenian irredentist policies in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Hungarian example according to the authors provides a good reasoning why irredentism was not resorted to by the state. In this case the state decided to use international norms such as bilateral treaties with neighbors to resolve boundary issues and in return sought assurances of good treatment of the Hungarian minorities (Saideman and Ayres 115). Thereafter Hungary has not resorted to aggression, which the authors point supports the argument that boundary norms can constrain irredentist behavior (Saideman and Ayres 131).  Similar situation was found to exist in the case of Romania (Saideman and Ayres 166) and thus the hypothesis that interstate boundaries limit irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 197) is a truism. As a corollary, the authors claim that irredentism occurs across intrastate boundaries as was the case with the former Soviet Union.  However, once the Soviet Union broke up, Russia has not resorted to aggressive irredentism with regards to its Russian kin in the former Soviet republic. Even in the case of Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war, in Chechnya, and to a lesser extent in Moldova and Georgia (Saideman and Ayres 181), the considerations were different. Russian nationalism, it seems played very little part in these Russian interventions. Here the authors reflect on power politics and the dominance of Russia over its former republics as being sufficient guarantor for Russia not to indulge in irredentist policies. 

International norms and pressures have not been adequate tools to prevent irredentist conflicts. A case in point is the clash between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Pakistani irredentist wars with India over Kashmir. In both these cases the international community has not exerted adequate pressure (Saideman and Ayres 229). In the case of Cyprus, the geographical isolation of both the mother countries from the island makes strident irredentism more difficult. In fact, the authors call the Turkish support for self determination its kin in Cyprus quasi-irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 219) as Turkish internal domestic compulsions, and its quest for EU membership prevent it from going the whole hog on the Cypriot question. The authors theorize that geographical proximity to the target audience makes it easier for nation-states to employ irredentist policies. 

Having studied the histories of numerous European countries in detail and some Asian countries in brief, the authors provide an analysis of what could be the policy implications of the study of irredentism. The finding that Kin outside the country are close to the group inside but not always identical (Saideman and Ayres 241) provides policy makers with options to deal with violence or threat of war. The very fact that Ireland did not resort to irredentism over the Northern Ireland issue shows that despite being same kin and in proximate positions, the Irish identified differently with their Northern brethren. They took a pragmatic view of their relationship with Britain and also realized that those on the outside were too many to be easily absorbed into the Irish fold and that Ireland had more to lose if it followed the IRAs agenda. Irelands economic growth and it ties to the EU mattered more (Saideman and Ayres 211) than any foggy notions of independence for Northern Ireland.

The authors analysis of Pakistans Kashmir policy is faulty and not based on deep study of the complexities of the problem in the Indian Subcontinent. The authors contention that the Punjab province of Pakistan being closest to Kashmir has a shared blood relationship and feelings of kinship (Saideman and Ayres 223) is completely wrong. It shows that the authors have no knowledge of the ethnic make-up of the Punjabis and the Kashmiris. The Pakistani Punjabis are the feudal landlords and the ruling elite of Pakistan who have little real sympathy for the Kashmiri cause. This is borne out by the fact that even the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan has seen no development whatsoever despite being in possession of that region for over sixty years. The reasons for Pakistani aggressions lie much deeper. The genesis of Pakistans Kashmir view lies in its two-nation theory which posits that Muslims of the Indian subcontinent cannot co-exist in the same country as Hindus and therefore require a separate state. This theory led to the partition of India but did not lead to all Muslims of independent India moving to Pakistan. In fact, to the chagrin of the Pakistani leaders, a large population stayed back and today India has the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia with Pakistan coming third. In the Kashmir region Muslim domination is only in the Kashmir valley with Jammu being predominantly Hindu and Ladakh predominantly Buddhist. Even amongst the valley Muslims, the predominant mood is independence from both India and Pakistan. Pakistans Kashmir policy has less to do with any irredentism and more to the ideological incompatibility that Kashmir represents. Its continuance as an Indian province strikes at the very heart of the idea of Pakistan and hence the single-minded pursuit of the ruling elite to wrest it from Indian control.   The authors though later on in the book hit upon the right reason for the so-called irredentism when they state that Pakistani leaders need to develop a cohesive national identity focused on something more than antipathy to India and nursing off old wounds (Saideman and Ayres 227).

Another important region the authors completely neglect is the Middle East. It is obvious that their theory of irredentism does not apply to the Middle East because after two bouts of irredentist Arab-Israeli wars, the Arabs have generally desisted from taking on Israel for the real and perceived mistreatment of its kin, the Palestinians. Obviously, realism, power politics, the military might of Israel and the unstinted support of America to Israel are reasons sufficient to dissuade Arab states from embarking upon irredentism. This is an angle that has not been sufficiently developed by the authors. The authors have only once discussed realism while explaining Russian behavior as to why they have not resorted to irredentism (Saideman and Ayres 178) even when all the possible factors existed in the erstwhile soviet republics.   

The book is important because it provides a dissenting view to some popularly held beliefs. One such belief is that ethno-nationalism is always violent and that minorities are always treated with disdain by the majority. Contrary to popular belief that xenophobia usually leads to war, the authors offer that xenophobia has in fact helped stop a number state to state conflicts that could have taken place after the fall of the Soviet Union. Irredentism in Post Soviet Union Europe did not happen on a wide scale but was only limited to a few countries like Serbia, Croatia and Armenia. The authors findings point out that nationalistic content mattered more than irredentism especially in multi-ethnic empires such as Hungary and Russia where both the Hungarians and the Russians were used to living in far flung areas and had not been really affected when their empires broke down. Even in their far flung homes away from mother country, Hungarians and Russians lived in relative prosperity without really suffering inequities in the hands of the new majority. When the Soviet Union broke up, Russian xenophobia was more concerned with the enemy within rather than imaginary or real plight of their kin in the erstwhile Soviet republics.

In contrast, Armenian irredentism was due to their relative inexperience of having ruled as an independent state, the preponderance of homogeneity in its populace. Also, Armenian Diaspora held prominent positions in the Azerbaijan government, where they tended to highlight the plight of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Irredentism in post-Soviet Europe was also muted by xenophobic fear of immigrants swamping the prosperous neighbors. Thus a territory full of poor ethnicity belonging to an erstwhile Soviet republic was better given off rather than shoulder the burden themselves.  This finding has important policy implications.   

The authors findings are quite succinctly put where they identify the relevance of borders in deciding irredentist behavior. This is largely true. Their next finding that democracies are more peaceful (Saideman and Ayres 227) sounds more like western triumphalism on the lines of Francis Fukuyamas End of History. Any political theorist can easily argue that democracies are far from peaceful. One just has to look at U.S. behavior from the end of the Second World War till to date where in the name of democracy the U.S. has assassinated world leaders, invaded countries, and killed thousands of innocent civilians in the Vietnam War, Iraq and other regions of the world for the sake of an ideology. This democratic triumphalism is perhaps the weakest part of Saideman and Ayress book.   The findings that membership of international organizations may not be enough to stop irredentism is largely correct as the example of Greece and Turkey, both being members of NATO still fighting over Cyprus shows.

Lack of relative power also does not explain Croat and Pakistani actions thereby correctly refuting deterrence theorists is in part a correct finding but the reasons for Pakistan do not lie in irredentism but in deeper problems of national identity. The finding that kinship is not a necessary ingredient for irredentist behavior has been convincingly argued by the authors.  Mother countries may or may not exhibit irredentist behavior on behalf of their oppressed kin is a truism. Thus irredentist behavior is more rooted in domestic political compulsions of the mother country is yet again convincingly argued by the authors which supports their main thesis.

In conclusion, it can be reiterated that Saideman and Ayres do break new grounds in explaining certain aspects of international relations that combines mainstream rationalist and constructive principles. The authors description of European geopolitics in terms of irredentism and the primacy of internal domestic compulsions are largely correct while they err considerably when applying the same theoretical principles to the Indian subcontinent where the reasons are much deeper than just irredentism. Overall, the book provides readers of IR and policy makers numerous options to formulate innovative approaches to future state-state relations.