Political Science

The Congo Crisis is said to have lasted from 1958 to 1961 during which Congo underwent some of the most violent times of its history to date. This paper shall attempt to shed light on the series of events that caused the situation to escalate and the subsequent reactions that they caused. Mediation and negotiation attempts made to subdue the situation shall also be considered for the role they played and the outcomes that they yielded. Furthermore, the paper will also elaborate on the short term and long term consequences that came forth and the applicable theories.  It is imperative to highlight at this point that the paper shall make extensive use of (Kriesberg, 2007) in order to develop rationale for any statements given.

The escalation phase  Actions  Reactions
The late 1950s saw the development of numerous political and semi-political organizations each of whom had a different motive for the perusal of independence. By the time the 1960s dawned, these groups had evolved into the most prominent players in the social scenario. It is imperative to note that these groups were formed as a result of the thirty year plan that was brought forth in 1955. The plan was in favor of the emancipation of Belgian Africa. The plan resulted in numerous suspicions being raised in the corridors of the Belgian government and the Evolues. Even though there was some support to the plan, most ethnic associations chose to denounce it and refused to support it. Even though the plan was never made part of any official implementation, its publication served to trigger a chain of events that is referred to as the Congo Crisis.

The political group ABAKO had been gaining momentum and had acquired a position where it was widely supported in the regions of Leopoldville and other areas of lower Congo. Subsequently, the Belgians lost control of lower Congo. When the government attempted to resist the change through curfews on the partys meetings, riots broke out and arrests were made. Reconciliatory attempts were made by the government to calm down the Congolese by inducting them into the government system on non-authoritative positions. However, the response from the Congolese overwhelmed the government and further rioting took place as nationalist parties competed aggressively.

Further discourse based attempts at reconciliation with Congolese parties also failed. While the Belgian government sought to acquire time, the Congolese demanded immediate independence. The spring of 1960 was chosen to hold elections that would be followed by the transfer of power. Patrice Lumumba and the Belgian supported Party National du Progress were the two major players in the election.

Joseph Kasa-Vubu was appointed to the position of President and Patrice Lumumba was appointed to the position of Prime Minister. The transfer of power took place in June 1960 but was followed by a mutiny from the military towards their European counterparts and superiors (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007). The Belgian government attempted to intervene through military means in order to restore the peace but the situation continued to escalate out of control as the military took on the form of an uncontrolled and unmonitored mob. Fortunately, Moise Tshombes Katangas Gendarmarie acquired independence in 1960 and was able to acquire assistance from Belgian forces. However the favorable turn was short-lived as the Katangan military failed in restoring peace in the face of the movement being led by the Association of the Luba People of Katanga.

As time went by, the conflict continued to grow and the number of elements in the conflict continued to increase. Also, conflicting parties began to opt for more aggressive methods. Following in on the footsteps of Katanga, South Kasai claimed independence. A president was put into place and Lumumba found himself dealing with not only Katanga but also with the self proclaimed of South Kasai. This event, like its predecessors, can be observed in the light of Kriesberg (2007) when he states that, The duration of a conflict is also related to its scope, since the longer it goes on the more people are likely to be engaged and affected. Mutually destructive conflicts between large scale collectivities are prone to persist for a very long time, even from generation to generation (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 156).

The UN intervened in the summer of 1960 upon the appeal of Prime Minister Lumumba. Lumumba, with the support of the UN, demanded that Belgian troops be withdrawn from Congolese regions. However, disagreement broke out between Lumumba and the UN mission upon Lumumbas desire to use the UN troops to subdue the disarray in Katanga and the prohibition to intervene in internal affairs as dictated by the UN charter (Scherrer, 2002).

The Congolese government began to doubt Lumumbas abilities and he was dismissed in September in the same year. However, Lumumba had grown in dominance across the region and was a figurehead to the regime in Stanleyville  (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007). He refused to be removed from his position and protested against his dismissal. The situation grew more complex when the parliament expressed their confidence in him. Nonetheless, Lumumba was placed under house arrest and was later killed in the custody of Katanga gendarmes and Belgian officers after being captured on his way to meet his supporters. Fighting between UN troops and the Katangese gendarmerie continued amidst highly controversial decisions and deaths of leaders.

Attempts at mediation, negotiation and resolution of the conflict
The conflict was not resolved without extensive military intervention. Countless negotiations were attempted throughout 1959 but they either backfired or were fruitless until 1961 came to a close with the launch of Operation Rum-punch, Operation Morthor and Operation Unokat by the UN in coalition with Congolese government in the last few months and control in Katanga and South Kasai was re-established in December in the same year (Mockaitis, 1999). However, the as noted earlier, military action was used only as a last resort and was only opted for once the government made all possible efforts at reconciliation through peaceful means. Also, the UN missions gave the armed opposition a significant number of opportunities to put down their weapons and UN troops were not allowed to launch any offensive unless specifically ordered to do so through their chain of command.

The final outcome
The final outcome came in the form of the restoration of control at the cost of millions of lives. Casualties were experienced by the Congolese government, the UN mission, the loyalists to the Katangas Gendarmarie and the people of Katanga. The government however was not able to establish control without assistance from the UN and the Belgian troops were expelled from the Congolese region.

Direct and indirect consequences of the conflict
Lumumbas death had national and international consequences. However, Katanga was not fully reacquired until Operation Grand Slam was launched by the UN in late 1962. Lumumbas death also led to the realization of his policies by the Congolese government. However, the situation refused to settle as a result of a large volume of armed opposition to the Congolese government. Skirmishes between UN forces and these armed loyalists to fallen leaders became common incidents. A significant development in this regard was that the UN found itself forced in a position where it had to intervene in a countrys internal affair. This was a violation of the standard UN charter and the turn of events that took place in the Congo crisis led the UN to be much more wary of the degree to which it let its troops become involved in a countrys internal conflict.

Theories that explain the conflict
The power transition theory can be observed in play in the Congo Crisis scenario. When the Belgian government chose to give way to Congolese representatives in the government, the scales tipped towards a balance which, in accordance with the principles of the Power transition theory, brought the state closer to internal war (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 212). Also, it was the weaker parties that came forth as the primary aggressor against the Belgian Government. Also, power transition came forth as a result of the volatility of the political influence in the country which serves to further qualify the scenario for subjection to the Power transition theory.

The state chose to exercise preventive war by prohibiting political party leaders from meeting with each other when the political parties began to develop momentum in 1959. Thus, it is evident that the state feared the development of this momentum. The attempts to develop an equality of power and the simultaneous presence of tendencies towards a change in power led to the generation of instabilities amongst conflicting sides (Crocker, Hampson,  Aall, 2007, p. 27).

The zero-sum concept can also be perceived in this scenario since the region of Katanga came forth in the conflict since the leadership in Katanga it considered itself to be in a zero-sum position. This comes as no surprise if one was to make use of FART and consider the sequence of events in terms of hindsight. During periods of stagnation or decline, struggles tend to be viewed as zero-sum and waged by each side to maximize its share of a constant or shrinking pie (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 307).

It is evident from the above discussion that the Congo Crisis was one that took place amidst numerous complications and that numerous theories come into play in the same regard. The Congo Independence crisis took place as a result of the instability caused by numerous parties simultaneously stipulating that their demands be met in an already extensively volatile environment. We can also surmise that the Congo Independence crisis serves as an example of the manner in which a situation goes out of control and the sequence of events deviates from what is expected as a result of increased tensions and underestimated underlying motivations towards the achievement of objectives.