Political Science

In discussing intelligence there are several distinctions made when describing the process of intelligence gathering. Richard Helms in his memoir A Look Over My Shoulder A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency makes the distinction between covert actions, clandestine operations and analysis. This leads to how covert and clandestine operations are part of the intelligence cycle. What is the relationship between covert operations and intelligence These are interesting questions and in order to answer them one has to start with some basic definitions.

A covert action is defined as an  action so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. In this particular case, the sponsor would be a government such as the United States. A clandestine operation is an intelligence or military operation carried out in such a way that the operation goes unnoticed. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines clandestine operation as An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.  Analysis is the decisive part of the intelligence process. It produces the insights for policymaking. It starts with identifying what the customer needs (requirements) and ends with delivering the intelligence (dissemination) to satisfy those needs. This is a simplification of a very complex process, but the conceptualization underlines the analysts pivotal role in transforming information provided by various collection systems into judgment and insight for the policy customer. Whether that information is good, bad, or somewhere in between, the
analyst must put it into a context that is relevant and useful for the policymaker.

Richard Helms story in A Look Over My Shoulder is full of tales of derring-do, but its real significance is likely to surprise spy-thriller aficionados and conspiracy theorists the C.I.A. is, first and foremost, simply a government agency. No differently than the Department of Agriculture, it executes White House policy. His professional life is essentially the story of undercover operations ordered by presidents. Standout examples Eisenhowers decisions to topple Prime Ministers Patrice Lumumba in Congo and Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba (continued by Kennedy), and Nixons clandestine war against Allende. On the big stuff, Helms makes a convincing case that rather than being a rogue elephant, an invisible government as often charged, the C.I.A. is a presidents political weapon of last resort, the keeper of the bag of dirty tricks. If agency acts appear roguish, Helms says, it is when government policy is roguish. He describes the dilemma when a president orders his intelligence chief to step out of bounds What is the D.C.I. to do .

Has he the authority to refuse to accept a questionable order on a foreign policy question of obvious national importance At this point, the spy chiefs choices are to sign on or resign.  Helms offers revealing instances of the uselessness of even the keenest intelligence if its message is unwelcome at the top. In analyzing the domino theory, which held that if Vietnam fell, the whole non-Communist world would teeter, Helms sent Johnson a secret assessment that concluded, The net effects would probably not be permanently damaging to this countrys ability to play its role as a world power. Johnson ignored the reports existence and pressed on with the war. During the cold war debate over the Soviet Unions capacity to deliver a first-strike knockout punch to the United States, the C.I.A. found that the Kremlin had neither the intention nor the weaponry to do so. The Nixon administration told Helms, in effect, to get on the team or shut up.

Cynthia Grabo in her work Anticipating Surprise Analysis for Strategic Warning, describes the function of warning intelligence. Warning intelligence is largely a post-World War II development. It evolved specifically as the product of the early days of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and other communist states had embarked on courses that were inimical to the interests and security of the Free World. This could possibly lead to surprise actions or open aggression. The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 dispelled many conventional or historical concepts of how wars begin. There was a distinct fear that Americas enemies would once again undertake devastating, surprise military action and there would be no prior declaration of war or other conventional warning. This fear was very real. The development of modern weapons and long-range delivery systems increased the need for warning to avoid a surprise attack.  The term warning intelligence evolved and developed as a way to describe the process of preventive measures within the intelligence community. It is generally restricted to (a) direct action by hostile states against the U.S. or its allies, involving the commitment of their regular or irregular armed forces (b) other developments, particularly conflicts, affecting U.S. security interests in which such hostile states are or might become involved (c) significant military action between other nations not allied with the U.S., and (d) the threat of terrorist action.  Grabos work was done during the 1940s, but the message still rings true today. Ms. Grabo points out in her work that warning intelligence must not be treated as a by-product of  intelligence production. Working a warning problem is to anticipate events within their fullest political, military, economic, diplomatic and cultural context. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were perceived as a complete surprise. This leads one to the conclusion that these events echo those of December 1941. The 21st century is a different world in many respects, but the principles of strategic warning have remained the same.

Bruce D. Berkowitz describes the reasons for using covert operations in intelligence. He indicates there are only two legitimate reasons for carrying out an operation covertly versus overtly. One is when open knowledge of U.S. responsibility would make an operation infeasible. One example is the CIA financing the Italian Christian Democratic Party in 1948. If this operation had become known,  the Communists would have successfully painted the Christian Democrats as U.S. lackeys, and CIA support would have backfired. Another valid reason for carrying out covert operations is to avoid retaliation or to control the potential for escalation. Covertness may be barely covered, but what little cover there is makes it useful. In the late 1940s, for example, the Soviet government knew the CIA was supporting resistance fighters in the Ukraine, since Soviet intelligence had penetrated most of the groups. Similarly, the Soviet leadership knew that the United States was supporting the Afghan mujaheddin in the 1980s. If U.S. leaders had admitted responsibility, Soviet leaders would have felt it necessary to retaliate, as was the case when President Eisenhower owned up to U-2 overflights in 1960, with the result that Khrushchev felt compelled to cancel the Paris summit meeting. Also in the case of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union could have struck at U.S. allies, perhaps with military action. Pakistan provided a base for the U.S. covert action in Afghanistan. Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia provided arms and materiel. All of these countries wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, and covertness helped persuade them to do so.

Thomas H. Henriksen in Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever, also makes a case for the importance between covert operations and intelligence. The US government should always take the conventional diplomatic steps in order to advance American interests and promote regional peace. But traditional methods such as sanctions, presidential appeals or threats, and American largesse (read bribes) does not influence iron-fisted adversaries. Really tough nuts, such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, and Cuba, are not cracked by sanctions nor will they modify their policies because a miffed U.S. State Department has withdrawn its embassy staff. Economic embargoes are even more difficult, since they hurt innocent victims in  sanctioned states. Even the resort to international tribunals to try wrongdoers for murderous acts, for instance in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, is not sufficient to forestall determined criminals. Ex post facto arrests come too late to stop cold-blooded criminality, and most indicted war criminals remain at large under unenforced arrest warrants. International law, while enjoying a renaissance since the post-World War II trials, is still not strong enough to be relied upon where weapons of mass destruction or ethnic cleansing are concerned.

The process of intelligence gathering requires defining such terms as covert actions, clandestine actions, and analysis. This leads to how covert and clandestine operations are part of the intelligence cycle. The relationship between covert operations and intelligence is clearly defined in works by Richard Helms, Cynthia Grabo, Bruce Berkowitz, Thomas Henriksen, and others. Without covert and clandestine operations the United States would be hard-pressed to continue to shape its foreign policy. While diplomacy remains the foremost tool, undercover operations go a long way in stimulating action in countries hostile to US interests.