U.S. Grand Strategy Europe or Asia

Since the American independence, the U.S. Grand strategy has seen dramatic shifts in its contours, scope and direction. In its early years after the union was declared, American Grand strategy was focused on first building the nation and a policy of isolationism and non-interference in the affairs of other nations. The contours of the US foreign policymaking strategies were shaped to a large extent by the advantages conferred by geographical isolation of the country, lack of contiguous enemies, absence of historical baggage and the indomitable, independent streak of its early settlers. The advantages mentioned above allowed a steady evolution of the US foreign policy from its early defensive doctrine of non-interference in European Affairs, the Monroe Doctrine, to a policy of Containment during the Cold War, to the policy of Unilateralism and Preemption that characterized much of the last decade to finally, a shift to a more inclusive and cooperative Multilateral strategy adopted by the Obama administration. However, with the U.S. military showing signs of overstretch due the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, threats from  a resurgent Russia and a rising China require a rethink of strategy whether America should revert to isolationism, or carry out a selective engagement strategy focused on either Europe or Asia. This paper argues that America needs to remain engaged with the world through a selective engagement strategy focused on Asia rather than Europe.

Extra-regional Hegemony theory is a neo-realist theory that includes systemic and domestic variables for conduct of a Grand strategy (Layne 28). The U.S. has been resorting to the use of this strategy since the end of the Second World War. At the grand strategic level, thinkers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski have argued that American hegemony was required to stabilize the world, especially the need for America to establish its supremacy over the Eurasian landmass as ever since the continents started interacting politically, some 500 years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power (Brzezinski xiii). This is indeed true in the present day context because most of the global oil is located in Eurasia within the Persian Gulf region and the Central Asian Republics. 

The meteoric rise of China is a threat which the U.S. clearly factors in its country specific strategy dovetailed into the overall grand strategy. In respect to China, the U.S., since the days of the Ping Pong Diplomacy (Vogel, Yuan and Tanaka 58) in the 1970s has been predicated on Engagement. The logic behind this engagement strategy has been quite sound. China is too large country with too great economic potential to be antagonized. The Chinese quite early had very clearly demonstrated their intentions to practice an independent foreign policy away from the Soviets. So while the Chinese gratefully accepted all Soviet help, they had their own aspirations which the American policy makers quickly understood. Thus a friendly China or even a neutral China was calculated as a great help to the United States to fight the Soviets. Despite the demise of the Cold War, this Engagement policy is very much in place. China now however, is emerging as a serious challenger to American power. It has been employing a Hedging strategy , also attempting to employ bandwagoning strategy with nations that have differences with the US.  Therefore, the United States has no option but to embark on an Engagement Policy coupled with a Hedging strategy (Tunsjo 112) against China. To counter the spread of Chinese influence in Asia and the Pacific, the United States can use India another rising regional power as a possible countervailing force against China other than the traditional hedges Taiwan and Japan. This combination of Engagement and Hedging is the best strategic option against China for the foreseeable future.

A resurgent Russia faces some very serious macro problems. Russian power is almost wholly centered on its oil reserves, a finite commodity. Russian technological prowess has declined dramatically, since the fall of the Soviet Union and the Russian governments analysis that it was the military-industrial complex which had brought ruination has resulted in policies that have taken away necessary money from research and development leaving America firmly in the lead as the worlds technological superpower. Russian demographics with a declining birth rate poses a serious problem to the countrys ability to sustain vitality. America suffers no such deficiency, maintaining a healthy replacement level of population through its unique melting pot strategy that attracts the best minds from world over to immigrate to America. The real danger from Russia comes from its covert help to the Iranian regime and Middle East players such as Syria. Russia has also sought to limit Western advance into the Central Asian Republics by launching the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is a grouping of Central Asian republics, China and Russia with India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers. The Russian focus, as can be deduced, remains firmly wedded to a McKinderite formulation centered on the primacy of Eurasia. 

The concept of Fortress America is an attractive one for those who consider that the previous two tenures of the Bush era were a folly and there is a need for America to withdraw from the world and recoup. Neo-Isolationism posits that having secured the Homeland by the extensive defensive homeland security measures and having weakened Al Qaida in Iraq and Afghanistan, America would be better served looking after its own self and desists from pulling out other peoples chestnuts out of the fire. Proponents of neo-isolationism argue that in the past America was isolationist in the 1930s (Johnson) and had benefited from such a policy. However, such an argument is fallacious as America had always been an internationalist power and cannot afford to disengage from the world especially now. In the globalized interconnected world, countries can no longer afford to follow isolationist policies. China, which for long had maintained its policy of isolation, had to change tack and integrate with the world economy. Even if America wishes to disengage from the international community, it cannot, because the engine of international commerce yet beats in New York and the decisions of International Geo-politics rest with Washington D.C.  Resorting to isolationism, as George Bush said, will only lead to danger and decline (Logan). Gelb qualifies the constituents of power to include economic and diplomatic tides rather than just initiating military storms (71). Also, the dangers from a globalised Islamic radicalism can create religious theocracies that could threaten American national interests (Fukuyama and McFaul 25-26). Therefore, American selective engagement strategy must aim at building democracies rather than spreading democracies throughout Asia. This is even more important considering the fact that America today depends heavily on Chinas continued efforts in underwriting American debt and that global economic power is steadily shifting from the West to the East. 

In conclusion, it can be emphatically stated that U.S. Grand strategy will require maintaining a selective engagement strategy focused on Asia.  The world needs Americas leadership and withdrawing precipitously from the scene will create a dangerous vacuum which is unlikely to be filled up by any of the lower ranking powers. An approach based on restoring domestic economic stability while simultaneously engaging with the world selectively with focus on Asia with an aim at building democracies rather than spreading democracy would be the best grand strategy option for the U.S. to follow.

Notes
Simply defined, Unilateralism means going at it alone, of taking independent action without recourse to consensus building or acceptance of the policy by international organizations such as the United Nations. The American invasion of Iraq is one such example of unilateralism. Unilateralism is the strategy of the strong and only the top tier of world powers can successfully execute such a strategy.  Unilateralism invariably draws opposition from friends and foes alike.

Preemptive strategy draws its strength from international law that allows for self defense and anticipatory self defense. American strategy in invading Iraq was in part based on this strategy of preemption to prevent Saddam Hussein from developing Weapons of Mass Destruction. In itself, such a preemptive strategy is justifiable under international law provided the necessity for embarking upon such a strategy can be supported by incontrovertible proof.

Multilateralism aims at building consensus amongst the comity of nations for taking any cogent action. Multilateralism, being an inclusive strategy helps develop legitimacy for actions taken. Multilateralism however, is a slower process as consensus building requires time, referral back to individual countrys domestic audience, compulsions and national interests and a compromise by all parties agreeing to abide by a multilateralist strategy. Multilateralism increases short term risks but offers a more stable long term outlook to a developing international situation.

An Engagement strategy is used when a direct adversarial strategy yields lesser payoffs or has a lesser chance of succeeding. Engagement strategy seeks to find avenues of cooperation and engagement with a possible adversary to produce a more stable global geopolitical system and maintain the balance of power. The US engagement strategy with respect to China initiated in the 70s by the Ford administration is one such example of an engagement strategy.

5. An engagement strategy in isolation can never produce the optimum payoffs that a nation might wish to acquire. Pure engagement might make the adversary much stronger than desired and therefore it is necessary to have a hedge against such occurrence. A Hedging strategy may include building relations with nations that may have inimical relations with the nation being engaged.

Weaker nations tend to follow the lead of a powerful nation to stave off threat to their national interests from that powerful nation. This is called as bandwagoning and also includes actions taken by countries to bandwagon with one strong nation to balance perceived threats from a hegemon or another powerful nation.

Sir, Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) in 1904 propounded the Heartland Theory that posited that the world island comprised of Europe, Asia and Africa and that most of the resources lay centered on the Russian land mass. The outer rim comprised of the island nations and the Americas but the heartland as such lay in Eurasia and thus whoever ruled Eurasia ruled the world.  Mackinders assertion at the beginning of the twentieth century changed the concept of closed international system of the 19th century to an idea of world domination as a viable political aim with the geographical pivot centering on the heartland of Eurasia. Mackinders Heartland Theory changed the ways geopolitics was conducted thereafter and greatly influenced Nazi Germanys strategists who sought to conquer the Russian land mass in their quest for world domination. Their subsequent defeat reinforced the Soviets perception of the centrality of the Russian landmass that then embarked on a predominant continental outlook.

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