Political Science

Do various states partner more frequently with the stronger or the weaker states during a clash Generally in the phraseology of international relation theories many states have the likelihood of balancing alongside or bandwagoning with a growing state to form an alliance. The response to this issue is crucial to the restructuring of grand alliance and the redefining of fundamental policy interests. If the various states defy the achievements of their neighboring states by combining efforts to level out the balancing among them, then invasion does not really pay and interferences to secure far-flung obligations are not only superfluous, but frequently unproductive in making weak states to come together against the interfering superpower and its responsibility. Contrary, if states settle to growing power, subsequently bandwagons will spin dominoes will literary collapse, and superpowers will see it intelligent, even if the decision will cost treasure and blood, to defend local areas of minute or no inherent worth to their state interests.

In this study, I will put efforts to critique the books notion and dimensions which have erroneously taken in the assumption that balancing and bandwagoning are just but conflicting behaviors provoked by the same ambition to realize higher and elaborate security mechanism. Accordingly, the notion of bandwagoning has been severally defined shallowly-as compliance to threats-as if it was just the reverse of balancing of power. In reality, on the other hand, various states have different motives when choosing either balancing or bandwagoning. The objective of balancing is mainly self-defense and the guard of ideas already realized In contrast, the purpose of bandwagoning is typically self-extension simply to attain values desired. In simple terms, the drive in balancing is the longing to shun losses while that of bandwagoning is the prospect for achievement. The existence of a considerable external threat, is a requisite for effectual and efficient balancing, but is not so for states to begin bandwagoning.

This essay commences by demarcation of the various positions in the debate of bandwagoning versus balancing. After which, I present a critique of balance-of-threat theory that is mainly on Walts view on bandwagoning and the restraints of this theory as a definition of coalitions. Next, I scrutinize the consistence and whether Walts empirical evidence is strong enough to sustain his way of thinking. Finally, I propose an alternative school of thought on police restructuring.

Summary
Balance of threat theory is a key leader in international relations realist (neo) theory. Basically, it restates that states balance alongside the rise of power because it develops an imperative predicament for their safety. Given that states exist in anarchical world they ought to balance against the growing state(s). It is in this line that Walts in his book, The Origins of Alliances argues against this theory (Walt, p.14). Walt criticizes the theory of balancing power by disputing that states not only balances against apparent powers but also against threats. He measures the theory relative to the alliances which took place between 1995 and 1979 in Middle East. In his argument he considers eight six different multilateral and bilateral alliances. He also takes into account another eighty six decisions of national interest. It is after keen look at the structures of these alliances that he asserts that balancing of threat thesis gives much better grip on alliance creation than variables of foreign aid, ideology, and political penetration. However, he holds that offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived intentions are also significant building blocks in political alliances (Walt, p.30-36).

Walt also says that cumulative power which consist of population, military and individual capabilities, geographic proximity, offensive power, technical prowess, and collective intentions all do have influence on the threat level. In addition, he says that balancing is more familiar than bandwagon behavior in relation to the alliances in the Middle East in the period mentioned above. He also says that there is a high probability of bandwagon from weak states than from strong states at the expense of balancing against emanating powers. Generally, Walts book on The Origins of Alliances is a significant study in illustrating the role played by perceptions in political alliances. It also plays a vital role in basic international relations and more so when power structures and material capabilities are to be considered (Walt, p.42).

In this book Walt views the balance of threat theory as a product of balance of power theory with the intention of explaining alliances between various states. States do form partnership not only to balance threats but also power. Though the allotment of power is an enormously essential aspect, the intensity of threat may also be influenced by unpleasant capability, geographic closeness, and hostile aims and or objectives. Therefore the other states power can either be an asset or liability though this depends more on the relative location, the states ability and most important how the power is used (Walt, p.47).

Walt proposes two ways of responding to threats. First, through balancing, in which states join efforts and act as one in dealing with the prevailing threat and second through bandwagoning or forming collaboration with states from which the danger is originating. According to Walt, balancing is more preferred by strong states than in states which are considerably weak. After performing a survey on political history of the Middle East as from the year 1955 to 1979, he discovered that the rule of balancing is commonly employed compared to bandwagoning (Walt, p.49).. He also observed from the survey that in the instances in which bandwagoning happened, only weaker states were involved.

Walt attributes this to the fact that these states are more susceptible to pressure and also due to the resources in these states which in most cases are insignificant the latter usually happens when ally states are not available and also in a situation where the political leaders have a believe that they can successfully appease threatening states. As well, Walt summarizes that similarities in ideas and state-sponsored machineries of escalating alliance dedication, like foreign military and economic assistance, are in many a time inferior to state security in forming of these alliances (Walt, p.50).

According to Walt, various origins of threat may assist in explaining why United States and other superpowers are not for regional alliances the superpowers are instead possible allies due to the truth that there are security threats from other states (Walt, p.52). To differentiate the various forms of alliances, Walt uses Israel and Egypt to answer the question why Israel and Egypt have often been the targets of alliance balancing (p.250). He says it is because they are extremely powerful regional giants. Walt says that they also have all-embracing enormous power support and enjoy substantial offensive capabilities. Both Israel and Egypt have been alleged as looking for ways of expanding at the expense of states (Walt, p.253)

Whether states bandwagon or go for balance of alliances to face threat  and whether policy and ideology machineries can influence coalition preferences  is vital since it resolves whether states are in general protected or not. In a situation where balancing is often frequent than bandwagoning, the states are viewed to be more safe, since the prevailing threat will definitely face a collective opposition. On the other hand, if bandwagoning is more widespread, the states tend to be more insecure, since opponents will catch the attention of more allies and this increases their authority while tumbling that of their aggressors (Walt, p.25). Walt views this disparity as central in the evaluation of the hopes for continued United States security during and after the Cold War (Walt, p.32). Below is a summary of the theory and its central arguments.

Hypotheses on Balancing and Bandwagoning
Hypothesis on Balancing
In general, the states encountering an external threat will often join with other states to resist the states bringing the threat. The greater the aggressive states combined power, the greater the propensity for other states to line up against it (Walt, p.35). The closer an authoritative state is, the larger the affinity for those in close proximity to ally against it. Therefore, close states are rarely likely to be friends than states which are divided by not less than one other authoritative state. The greater the violent states combined power, the greater the inclination for other states to array against it. As a result, states with abusively oriented military abilities have high probability of provoking other states to build up defensive alliances. The more violent a states professed aims, the more probable that other states are to line up against that specific state. Alliances developed during times of war will split up when the enemy is conquered.

Hypothesis on Bandwagoning
The General form of bandwagoning is that states encountering an externally imposed threat will tend to form coalition with the primary threatening authority. The larger a states combined abilities, the bigger the propensity for other states to line up with it. The closer a powerful state is geographically, the higher the likelihood for those in close proximity to line up with it. The larger a states combined abilities, the bigger the propensity for other states to line up with it. The more violent a states apparent aims, the lower the probability that the other states are to line up against it. Coalitions developed to go up against a certain threat will fall apart if the threat tends to become unmanageable.
Hypotheses on Conditions Favoring Balancing over Bandwagoning
The conditions in favor of balancing than bandwagoning include
Balancing idea is more widespread compared to bandwagoning.

The more authoritative the state is, the larger its likelihood to balance. Conversely, weak states will tend to balance against states of the same status. However may resolve to bandwagon if threatened by states of great authority.

The larger the likelihood of coalition support, the larger the likelihood to balance, if sufficient allied shore up is sure, but, the propensity for buck-passing or joy-riding raises.

The more obstinately violent a state is professed to be, the higher the likelihood for other states to balance in opposition to it.

In times of war, the nearer one side is to conquest, the greater the propensity for other states to bandwagon with that state

Hypotheses on Ideology and Alliance Formation
The General form according to Walt is that, the more alike the internal ideology of at least two states is, the more the likelihood that they are to combine effort. The more hierarchical and centralized a movement approved by the ideology is, the more fragile and conflictive any resultant coalition will be. Consequently, Leninist movements are likely to find steady alliances harder to uphold compared to either democracies or monarchies. The more safe a state sees itself to be, the bigger the influence of ideologies on coalition choices (Walt, p.37).

 As a result, alignments of ideologies are more probable in a bipolar world and so, the larger the benefit to the defense in times of war, the greater the effect of the ideologies on alliance preferences. States missing domestic or internal legitimacy will have a high likelihood to seek ideological coalitions to amplify both domestic and foreign support. The effect of the ideology on the selection of coalition partners will be overstated statesmen are likely to overestimate the measure of agreement on the ideologies among their adversaries and allies (Walt, p.40).

Hypotheses on Foreign Aid and Alliance Formation
The general form according to Walt is that the more foreign aid is provided to a given state by another single state, the higher the possibility that the two states will form an alliance. The more assistance provided, the larger the control of the recipient state by the donating state. Foreign aid is a special form of balancing behavior. For that reason, the larger the peripheral threat encountering the recipient state is, the larger the outcome of assistance on alignment. Greater monopoly of the aid provided by the donor implies greater leverage over the recipient state. The higher the unevenness of reliance favoring the donor state is, the higher its leverage over the beneficiary state. The higher the unevenness of incentive in favor of the donor state is, the higher its leverage will be over the beneficiary state. Since the beneficiarys refuge is more often than not more uncertain, on the other hand, unevenness of incentive will typically be in favor of the beneficiary. Weaker apparatus of internal political decision-making of the donor state will imply it can only impose lower leverage on the beneficiary (Walt, p. 46).

Hypotheses on Penetration and Alliance Formation
According to Walt, the higher a states right of entry to the political structure of another state is, the higher the propensity for the two states to form an alliance. Penetration is more successful against societies which are more open. Penetration is also more efficient if the objects are limited. As a result, the more invasive the idea of penetration is, the higher the prospect that it will end up having a negative impact on the actual alignment. Conversely, penetration is more effectual if only the other states contribution enhance the alliance (Walt, p. 49).

Balance-of-Threat Theory and Its Critics
In Walts book on The Origins of Alliances, he presents a more refined meaning of balance-of-power theory, by introducing balance-of-threat theory. Like the theory of structural balance-of-power, Walt summarizes that various states regularly balance and seldom bandwagon contrasting them, on the other hand, he claims that various nations do not line up exclusively or even mostly when responding to the allocation of abilities. Alliance of States selections are instead driven, Walt also has the claim that, by disparity of threat, when a single state or alliance is chiefly and equally dangerous (Walt, p.12).The intensity of threat that a given state is able to issue to other states is as a result of its internal combined power, offensive capability, geographic proximity, and also the perceived violence of its objectives (Walt, p.50).

Walt also asserts that his theory is an improvement of the theory of balancing of power by presenting deeper and self-explanatory supremacy with identical thriftiness (Walt, p.14). Since combined power is just one of various structures composing a threat, the theory of Walts elaborates on the constituents, the creation of overlarge successful state alliances in World War I and war II, and potential of such alliances are more or less the same in power. Under such prevailing conditions a state will only alliance with the least dangerous side (Walt, p.52).

His theory is a convincing and an impressive adjustment of conventional theory of balancing power. Walt assembles on the already existing theory but in a constructive and critical manner, and he manages to present a comprehensive and persuasive set of thoughts supported by a unique survey of coalition development in numerous regional and worldwide cases. Despite the fact that the available evidence seems to support his central argument, conversely, Walts theory has not been able to escape criticism. In spite of these endeavors to disgrace the implication of alliance formation in balance-of-threat theory, he has been in a position to respond successfully for a number of reasons (Walt, p.60)...
One, Walts theory foresees nearly all the instances of bandwagoning that the reviewers attribute to internal origins. In line with the determinants of power illustrated by Walt, states with leaders who are not legitimate, government institutions which are weak and with insufficient ability to rally economic sources are feeble states that are in most cases likely to experience bandwagoning. According to Snyder (1990), states are likely to bandwagon and are not likely to balance as efficiently as the predictions presented in balance-of-threat theory, persuasively Walts manages to disprove this squabble by highlighting  that the vagueness of the intentions of Hitler preceding to Munich and the dynamic autonomous reaction after March 1939 (Snyder, 1990)

Two,  he alleges that flimsy leaders frequently bandwagon with minor adversaries to oppose their prime internal threats is steady with the overall argument of Walt that democratic balance in opposition to the major threat to secure their survival (Verosta, 1971). Three, Walt enjoys a wide chance in the argument since there is no other person who has been able to undertake an extensive survey of state alliance in the Southwest Asia and Middle East, both of which are Third World nations. This challenge, alleges his critics, is that the realist theory is not in a position to elaborate and is somehow silent in relation to Third World coalitions. As for resource-provision role of coalitions aroused by Barnett and Levy, he in fact tries the suggestion that nations select coalition associates in so as to acquire side gains of material things, for example economic or even military donation and finds insufficient back up for it. Lastly, the critics have not been able to present an alternative theory to dispute theory of balancing-of-threat. As a result Walts theory holds up comparatively well as a way of explaining choices of coalitions (Fedder, 1968).

In conclusion, the balance of threat theory gives an outstanding clarification for the prior theory of balancing of power in democratic world. Walt has managed to win the debate since his critics, except Barnett and Levy, have long sided up with his idea that choices of alliance are best illustrated as a way of responding to threat, despite the fact that some have extrapolated the center of attention to comprise of both internally and externally emanating forms of threats (Levy, 1991). Accordingly, the internal critics have not been able to question Walts way of definition of bandwagoning as surrendering to the most damaging threat.