WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT FRENCH BASE AGREEMENT WITH UAE ON DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE GULF

The establishment of a French military base is evidence of Frances relationship with the United Arab Emirates. For obvious reasons, the mutual military agreement will benefit both sides, a point that will be discussed further in this report. Recent threats to security in the Arabian Gulf gives rise to a plethora of discussions regarding this regional strategic shift triggered by the establishment of the French Military Base. This paper contains a discussion on the global importance of the Gulf, the effects of the agreement on defense cooperation in the region including that of its relationship with Iran and Iraq.

The Arabian Gulf is a 989 kilometer-long inland sea that separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula.  This 55 kilometer-wide oil-rich region is located between Oman and Iran. The six Gulf States are the countries with a coastline on the PersianArabian Gulf, namely Iran United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. Today, the Gulf region is a flourishing economic power, so much so that the worlds economic powers are combining their efforts to ensure the stability of the region. The US spearheads this effort to safeguard the Gulf.

Just last year (2009), Nikolas Sarkozy spearheaded the opening of a permanent military base dubbed as the Peace Camp, in the Gulf region. The establishment of this base is considered a daring move by France1, as it is the first time that the country has installed a military operation in a country where it was never a colonial master. Moreover, the nation is set to compete with Britain and US for military and commercial influence in the area, and faces Iranian security threats in the region head on2.
The military base in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) is built 220 km (137 miles) from the Iranian coast. It has 500 troops, naval and aerial operations that will ensure the safety of shipping lanes and strengthen the fight against Somali pirates. The establishment of yet another foreign military base in the area sends another warning message to Irans nuclear program 1.

At the inauguration of the base, Sarkozy said that Frances entry into the region was the beginning of a long-term commitment by the country to ensure stability in the Gulf. He said that Frances, engagement in the region was not a question of targeting a particular country, probably Iran, but responding to a call for military support from its friends in the Emirates. French Centrist leader Francis Bayrou opposes this move by Sarkozy saying that it exposes the country to the risk of being dragged into a prospective war in the region 1, a risk recognized by Sarkozy as evidenced by his response in interviews. In one interview he said Be assured that France is on your side in the event of a security risk Through this base  the first in the Middle East  France is ready to shoulder its responsibilities to ensure stability in this strategic region If Iran were to attack, we would definitely be attacked also.1b

Frances military agreement with the UAE signals a strategic shift in defense planning in the Gulf because it is unlike previous military agreements which are usually made with the US or Britain. Such move by the UAE will be explained later in connection with increasing US-Iran military tensions.

Shared Benefits
As mentioned earlier, France had no presence in the gulf region until the establishment of the Peace Camp last year. This decision to establish a military base in Abu Dhabi was unforeseen and thus it generated a great deal of interest in the Gulf region and beyond. The French, for their part, are primarily driven by their visions of entering the arena of world powers by placing themselves in a strategic position which is in the Arabian Gulf. For the UAE, this military agreement with France is also a first for them. Their decision to permit the first foreign military base on their territory is also driven by new strategic considerations. Hence, there is no doubt that the move to establish the base in Abu Dhabi was founded on mutual agreement and on the principle of shared benefits for the two sovereign states.

President Sarkozy claims that this military agreement with the UAE is a response for latters call for a military aid in the event that war starts. Nicole Stracke 4, a researcher in the Security Department of the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai observed that the main function of the base could not be military operations. She inferred that the Sarkozy government have placed the French interests above anything else. This statement is based on the fact that there is only a limited number of military personnel who are to be stationed permanently on the base. The main function of the base is to provide logistical, communication and monitoring support. The base in Abu Dhabi is also a strategic long-term investment for France and a part of the states vision to play a bigger role in the Gulf in the coming years.

The military base on the UAE coast will definitely aid France to keep an eye on the Gulf waters, and in particular the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is the passageway of 40 percent of the worlds oil export. Although French naval forces have been regularly visiting the Gulf area in cooperation with the US team that patrols the waters, they realized that such operations are more expensive in the long run than having a base in one of the six states. Moreover, they believe that the establishment of a permanent base will improve their image and credibility as a world power, assisting them to realize their agenda - to be taken seriously by other nations. This, in turn, could bring them more political and economic power in the Gulf 4.

Stracke 4 comments further on this move by the French government
The growing Russian and Chinese interest in the region on the one hand and the weakening of US power and influence on the other have persuaded France to bridge the emerging security gap and establish a modest foothold in the region. In principle, having a military base in the Gulf close to hot spots such as Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan brings about a long-term commitment for the French government in world politics at the same time it could place France in the firing line and could force undesirable involvement in regional conflicts. Elevating tensions in the Gulf waters, particularly the threat from ambitions of Iran, the establishment of a military base in UAE is a welcome move for their government.
   
The UAE is small in size and population and this limits its military power and self-defence capabilities. Like most Gulf States, it depends on external protection. The UAE, until last year had no foreign military base on its territory unlike its smaller Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners such as Kuwait, Bahrain or Qatar.  With the growing tensions in the Gulf region, in particular the belligerent behaviour of its neighbour Iran over the past year, the UAE feels vulnerable to outside threats and intimidation.

Those knowledgeable in the politics of the Gulf region may ask why UAE chose France over the US or Britain. For one, the US has domination over the area in terms of military support and foreign economic control. Britain is second to them 4. Ebtisam Al-Kitbi, associate professor of political science at UAE University has this to say The UAE does not want to continue putting all its eggs in the U.S. basket, especially after the conflicting signals coming out of Washington concerning many issues, including Iran, The French base would bring about more balance to the region and increase the deterrence of Arab Gulf countries against Iran and subsequently improve stability.

For several years, the United States has been the only foreign country with permanent military bases in the region. Arab officials have been talking about bringing other foreign military partners. Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said at the December 2004 Gulf Dialogue meeting in Bahrain that guarantees for gulf security cannot be provided unilaterally, even by the only superpower in the world,. What the region needs is a kind of security that can only be provided by the collective will of the international community and not just the US.

The U.S. has been causing a great deal of concern among Arab Gulf countries because of conflicting and dangerous statements and policies made by Washington that have led to the current situation in Iraq and to a mounting tension with Iran, Al-Kitbi remarked. Moreover, the U.S. image in the region has deteriorated as a result of the global war on terrorism and the failed Palestinian-Israeli peace process. 5She said that France is seen as more moderate and rational in its policies toward the Gulf as opposed to the US. She hinted at the recent military action over Tehrans controversial nuclearprogram, interference in Iraq and support of groups regarded by Washington as terrorists. Al-Kitbi said the French military presence would help restrain the Bush administration from making irrational, unilateral moves that could lead to war.5 However, other experts say the French presence in the region, which recently included an aircraft carrier would be helpful to the Americans.

This newly established deal of France with the UAE will boost the French defense industry, whose regional sales include the Mirage 2000-9 jet fighter, Leclerc main battle tanks and a large variety of Eurocopter helicopters. According to Al Qallab, This military partnership will eventually give a strong momentum to the French defense companies competing with U.S. and Russia for the lucrative UAE and gulf markets,

Karasik said Britain, China or Russia might attempt to follow in the footsteps of France. He said The way events have been building up in the region ever since Sept. 11, 2001, could lead to similar actions in the region, enabling Arab Gulf countries to explore building ties with a host of alternatives in Europe and Asia,.

Arab Gulf leaders will seek to enhance economic ties with Asia and Europe with the objective of strengthening political relations that might develop into defense partnerships like the opening of the French base in the UAE, she said. The U.S. must notice this change, and subsequently improve its foreign policy and reconsider its actions in order not to miss the major strategic shift that seems to be happening. 5

For UAE, the solution to its security concerns is not in inviting the US troops to set up a military base because the US has a negative image in the region. The French image in the Gulf region is far better than that of the US and even better than that of the British. The French-Gulf relations are not burdened with any negative colonial baggage. 4

The French Government claims that their involvement in the region started long ago and was only made formal last year during the inauguration of the base. There has been a long-standing military and security cooperation between France and UAE since their 1995 mutual defence agreement. Political, economic, cultural and educational cooperation are also in the ascendant 4. Last year Sarkozy launched the opening of building works on the Louvre Abu Dhabi, an unprecedented project to build a museum and loan works from French museums to the Gulf state. Sorbonne University has also begun strengthening their links with the Gulf and the state is heavily investing in cultural initiatives on French language-teaching in the region1b.

Importance of the Arabian Gulf
The significance of the Gulf primarily lies in oil but that is not all there is to it as will be shown later in the discussion. Today, the Gulf remains one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in world oil transportation. A quarter of the worlds oil reserves and 45 of the worlds natural gas reserves are contained in the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf States also maintain approximately one-third of the worlds productive oil capacity1.

The Gulf States have also entered the ranks of major players in the world economy after many years of being in the sidelines of the global economic arena. Unlike other global economies such as Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom, Gulf States are thriving due in part to a world dependence on fossil fuels. Wall Street even goes hat in hand to their sovereign wealth funds asking to be bailed out of their current financial woes. The Gulf States are also home to the most marvellous real estate projects. Bankers in New York and London have been pulling up their stakes to move into the Gulf. Tiny stock exchanges like Qatars now boast a tie-up with NYSE Euronext, even as Donald Trump has lent his name to high-profile real estate projects in the region.

The size of their economies more than doubled from 350 billion in 2002 to 730 billion in 2006. That represents an average annual growth rate of 13 which is above that of Chinas and Indias which are 9-10.  The regions stock markets also are booming 5.

Global Guru 6 further expounds on the growth of the Gulf region
While both developed and emerging markets endured their worst start to the year in decades, in the first six months of this year Bahrains stock market climbed 16.45, Omans jumped 23.98 and Qatars rose 29.14. And the credit crisis notwithstanding, Gulf-based companies more than tripled the amount of capital they raised in global capital markets to fund regional and international expansion.

Gulf banks have also managed to sidestep the credit crunch. Their success can be attributed to a combination of strong domestic economies and conservative management. With strong domestic growth fuelling profits, Gulf banks never needed complex debt instruments and structured investment vehicles that were popular with U.S. and European investment banks to help boost profits.  In the past year, Qatari banks are nearly 50 up Omani banks have gained 44 and Abu Dhabis sector has risen nearly up to 30. Their western counterparts share prices on the other hand, withered 6.

The Gulf States have since become best known for the new financial heft theyve acquired in global economies -- and of course, for bailing out U.S. financial institutions. With all the figures connected to them going up, it the Gulf States have been considered as the trust fund babies of the global economy. They are now considered as the shoulder to cry on and financial supporters of many countries who are in trouble financially 6.  Protecting the Gulf therefore, from both internal and external threats, is a must for western countries who have implored their help. This includes France.
It can be remembered that France, together with other large economies, slipped into recession last year. Since France is one country dependent on the Gulf States for its energy sector, protecting the Gulf should be an obligation. Such obligation is also rooted in the fact that if one big economy that is connected to another powerful economy goes down, then the other will have a high probably of being dragged down also. This is true in the case of the French and the Americans, who up to this day are highly dependent on the Gulf region. If they were not, they would not bother to invest much in the protection of the region.  Secretary Lord Mandelson of the UK can be quoted saying ...the key point is all these economies rely on each other. Partnership with a region requires the maintenance of a sound economy for both areas 6b.

Despite the importance of the gulf as the worlds largest oil supplier, some lawmakers opine that protecting the gulf should be the least of their priorities in terms of budgetary planning and policy making. A case in point is Senator Charles Schumer saying, To most Americans, a well-armed Saudi Arabia is far less important than a reasonable price for gasoline, heating oil, and all other products upon which oil is based. He sought to block the proposed sale of 900 satellite-guided joint direct attack munitions kits to Saudi Arabia. 6c

Threat to security
With Frances official entry into the Gulf, it has to face a plethora of security threats, prevent them from being realized and prepare in the event of a war. There are different kinds of threats that should be considered in terms of conventional military fights. There are land force, airmissile and naval threats. There are also threats against the stability of the area coming from changes in the political landscape, demographics, foreign labour and social change. These are both internal and external in nature6.

So much oil passes through oil transit chokepoints. They are narrow and in principle can be blocked due to shipping accidents and pirate attacks. 90 percent of oil exported from the Gulf is transported through the well-known Strait of Hormuz, mentioned earlier1.

The Gulf region has already been at the centre of two conflicts involving Iraq and the US in the late 20th and early 21st century. The First Gulf War which lasted from January to February of 1991 involved Iraq and a coalition of 32 nations including the US, Britain, Egypt, France and Saudi Arabia. The war was a consequence of Iraqs invasion of Kuwait the year before. The Second Gulf War or the Iraq War (March-April 2003) was at large a US-British campaign against Iraq 3.

Large economies are involved in the war for the reasons that they need to maintain stability and peace in the region due to their energy dependence in the area. If the region is in turmoil, oil cannot be supplied and their respective economies cannot be sustained. Any threat to security within the area should be curbed. Recently, another country has been threatening the security of the Gulf, and that is Iran.

Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a statement made on October 1, 2006, said If you would like to have good relations with the Iranian nation bow down before the greatness of the Iranian nation and surrender. If you do not accept to do this, the Iranian nation will later force you to surrender and bow down.

Iran has plans of closing the Gulf and removing Western powers in the region. The Islamic Republic has been suspiciously creating weapons of destruction, including nuclear ones. Iran also has the uncanny ability to conduct wars of intimidation with their press releases against the United States and its allies. Defence ministries cannot predict the timeframe for any nuclear threat coming from Iran because of the secrecy in which they are working on their nuclear weapons 8.

Most recently, there has been an evolving range of threats from conventional military threats to Wars of Intimidation. There have been attempts from Iran to strike at critical nodes or infrastructures in the Gulf region. They have also increased their demonstrative attacks to increase security risk intimidation. Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or the exploitation of internal sectarian, ethnic, dynastic or regional tensions have proliferated. All these affect the security of the Gulf region and Iran remains the number one threat to the stability of the area for all of the above reasons 8. Recent oil spills, the introduction of floating mines to Gulf waters, Libyan stealth mining of the Red Sea, use of the Quds force in Iraq, Makkah pilgrimage incidents, support of Shiite groups in Bahrain, missile and space tests, and the proliferation of Iranian Missiles8 are some of the tangible tactics being employed by Iran in their attempt to intimidate other nations.

According to Tariq Khaitous, a Middle East security expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the nuclear armament of Iran could allow the country to dictate oil policy and embolden extremists groups in the region. Former President Bill Clintons 1999 Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI), identified Iraq and Iran as major threats to the regions and emphasized that the Gulf is vulnerable to ground invasions, missile strikes, and chemical or biological attacks. The GCC however lacked unity over their threat perception and thus limited the follow-through in the establishment of a defense pact between the Gulf States and the US in 2000.

The GCC states are vulnerable. None have strategic depth, save for Saudi Arabia. Their armies are small. In fact Irans army has a greater manpower than the combined manpower of all the GCC states. Irans army has a total manpower of more than 540,000 as opposed to 176,500 of the GCC states. Moreover, there is little evidence of strong collaboration between the GCC states.

Iran as a Threat to Security
Iran--- with its nuclear program and support for terrorists--- is seen as the main threat to gulf security. Even if Iranian missiles and terrorist attacks are not aimed directly at the Gulf States, their destabilizing threat to the Middle East as a whole is unsettling enough.

Iranian assertiveness in the Arabian Gulf continues to vex the US and its allies in the Gulf region.  In 1988, an Iranian-laid minefield struck the USS Samuel B. Roberts and wounded ten sailors as the US Navy escorted commercial traffic through the gulf. The Operation Praying Mantis of the US retaliated and overwhelmed Irans facilities11,.  HYPERLINK httpwww.meforum.org2580gulf-states-shadow-of-iran l _ftn3  In 2004, Iran caused another global controversy as its deputy oil minister accused Qatar of producing more than its rightful share from a natural gas field it shares with Iran.Three years later, Hossein Shariatmadari, head of the governments flagship publication Kayhan Daily and an appointee of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, wrote that Bahrain was more a province of Iran than an independent country.   In February this year, Iran repeated its claim to sovereignty over Bahrain.

In 2007, Iran exhibited its ambitions by capturing fifteen British sailors on Iraqi waters and keeping them for almost two weeks. Bringing back memories of the capture of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the mass hostage taking that followed, this was also intended to show Irans heedlessness of international law and its penchant for the humiliation of its enemies.11

The following year, there were incidents between US ships and Iranian speedboats that depicted Irans asymmetric threat to maritime security.   In July of that year, Iran opened a maritime office on the Abu Musa islands, which the UAE opposed. In September, Iran assigned the 20,000-man Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) navy rather than the less confrontational regular navy to Persian Gulf defense and opened a new naval base on the strategic Strait of Hormuz the following month.
In June last year,  the former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief, Mohamed El-Baradei, verbalized the unspoken messages of Iran in terms of its military upgrading and the assignment of the IRGC for their Gulf defense. He said, Dont mess with us we can have nuclear weapons if we want it.

Internal Threats to Security
It has already been mentioned that certain changes in the political landscape, demographics and social structure pose threats to the stability and security of the Gulf. Another threat that will be considered in this paper is the GCC threat to itself.

According to Cordesman8 there has been pointless intra-state feuding in the GCC. If this continues, the GCC will not be able to successfully maintain stability and security in the area if they themselves are not in order. Cordesman8 recommends the following measures first, leaders must prevent conflict and take their defences as seriously as they their militaries. They should end pointless intra-state feuding and create a real GCC, that is, a real organization that is symbolic of cooperation. They should opt for standardization in their military equipment. Fourth, they should focus on key mission needs and have integrated battle management. Lastly, they should establish a partnership with US, UK, and France not just de facto dependence8.

Iran in recent times has promoted the indigenization of the defense system or the use of local forces in the defense of the Gulf. The Iranian Defense Ministrys strategy is to strengthen local defense cooperation with the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. For Iran, this is an important step because the establishment of stability and lasting security in the region is a top priority for Irans action towards diplomacy. Just this year, Tehran and Doha signed a defense cooperation agreement which signals the beginning of the so-called indigenization.

According to the agreement, Iran and Qatar will exchange specialized and technical committees, will expand cooperation in training, and will conduct joint campaigns against terrorism and insecurity in the region. 19

It seems that this Tehran-Doha agreement is meant to stabilize the region. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said that Iran only uses its defense capabilities to help maintain security and stability in the region and that they do not pose any threat to anyone 19. For some analysts however, the accommodating act of Qatar towards Iran means that Gulf States are slowly succumbing to the powers and intimidation of the Islamic Republic. Iran wants all foreign military powers out of the region. They want independence in terms of handling their own security, their governments and their economies. This foreseen independence is of course tantamount to the prospective eradication of US and French bases in the Gulf. This scenario for some constitutes a threat because to some level, all the Gulf States in the future would be controlled by the Iranian power.

The following excerpt was taken from Patrick Knapps The Gulf States in the Shadow of Iran 11
Washington should use the Gulf Security Dialogue to counter Irans regional ambitions. To this end, the dialogue has indeed made important inroads, especially in coordinating interoperable defense and augmenting the Persian Gulfs arms edge. In April 2008, Bahrain and Kuwait signed their first bilateral security accord. In July 2008, the Department of Defense notified Congress of the possibility of the first GSD-related defense sale to Qatar. But the future success of the dialogue depends on the Persian Gulfs perception of U.S. strategy in the rest of the region. If the Persian Gulf states suspect White House realism will sacrifice their defense on the altar of a deal with Tehran, they may decide they have no choice but to make accommodation with the Islamic Republic, a tendency that ultimately may undercut the U.S. ability to maintain a presence in the region.
   
 Iran, has for a long time under the rule of President Ahmadinejad, maintained an anti-foreign policy and it also continues on a steady path of militarization. In fact, during his first term, President Ahmadinejad filled two-thirds of his cabinet ministry posts with former IRGC personnel or members of the Basij auxiliary force . The overall sentiment in Iran is anti-foreign as shown by Supreme Leader Khamenei in his statement do not vote for those who by bowing their heads to foreigners do away with our honour. Apparently, this is an endorsement of Ahmadinejads re-election last year.
Ahmadinejad has successfully been restored to power and he has interpreted this as a green light to his aggressive foreign policy. For outsiders, his appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as his Defense Minister is terrifying. Vahidi is the former Qods Force chief of the Revolutionary Guards that are wanted by Interpol for the murder of eighty-five people in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 11

It has been reported that Ahmadinejad blamed the United States and its allies for spreading war, bloodshed, aggression, terror, and intimidation in the whole region.  Until now, Iran rejects President Obamas invitation for them to join the community of nations.

Cooperation vs Rivalry
The French entry into the Gulf may not necessarily be viewed by all as a welcome move. To some it signals competition with other foreign powers. However, recent developments in Frances international relations add a new dimension to the issue.

Since the US is the dominant foreign power in the gulf, the next question to ask is whether or not the US is amenable to France-UAE military agreement. Being the top ally of the GCC, the US should be consulted whenever a major decision such as the France-UAE deal is made. It seems that UAEs choice of France is a blow to the ego of the worlds super power. Recent developments in US-French relations suggest that the US is indeed in harmony with this partnership.  The Americans also see the French as potential allies in their big and multiple obligations in the gulf, primarily the crises in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. The US resources are stretched and they could do with a helping hand. The entry of France seems to be a welcome move and the responsibility to ensure the security of the Gulf can be shared.

A French military base in the UAE could also benefit the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2004, NATO initiated the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), a strategic partnership between NATO and some of the GCC states. The report has more to say3

The UAE and France are both part of the initiative and we can assume that a military base in Abu Dhabi would contribute to a better NATO-GCC understanding, deepening the relations in particular with regard to security cooperation, military exercises and information sharing, all topics that are on the top of the ICI agenda. For France, the military base certainly improves its status within NATO as well as with the US as it would become the only NATO member other than the US that is stationed in the Gulf. A better NATO-GCC relationship is tantamount to better cooperation between the six Gulf States and its foreign military partners.
   
Theodore Karasik, Middle East security analyst at RAND Corporation, Los Angeles said In case of a confrontation with Iran, the French military presence would be a complementary package to the U.S. forces there. 6

It is hardly surprising that the only country which is not at ease with the establishment of the Peace Camp is Iran. The day after the official announcement, Iranian commentators dubbed France a puppet of the US and criticized it for having no decisions of its own. The establishment of a French military base in the UAE, close to the Strait of Hormuz, is a major strategic concern for them. As implied earlier, the essential precondition for establishing a regional security system in the Gulf for Iran is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region. Because France has entered the picture, it is now not only faced with the US military bases at its doorstep, but it also has to contend with a French base. Sooner or later other countries will follow. This move by France opposes the indigenization plans of Iran. This also signals the gradual internationalization of Gulf security. It is largely probable that the China and Russia could soon follow the footsteps of France.

Side Effects of the French Agreement
It is expected that as France expands its international sphere of influence, its culture will also advance. As mentioned earlier, Sarkozy announced the official start of the construction of the Louvre Abu Dhabi which is a museum that will house loan works from French museums. The museum is expected to be finished in 2012 or 2013. French-language teaching is also at the top of their agenda in terms of cultural initiatives. The Sorbonne University has already cemented its ties with its Gulf partners.

The French presence in the Gulf is a welcome move for the six Gulf States because of their ever increasing need to acquire more foreign military aid outside what of the US provides. This is the logical result of the existing tensions between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, the US alone cannot shoulder the entire burden of defending the Gulf. With new administration installed under the first African-American President Barack Obama, America seems to care less about its defense as evidenced by their recent budget cuts for the military. The US therefore needs a helping hand in defending the Gulf20.

The Peace Camp is strategically located at a place where the Gulf waters (where 40 of the oil passes) can be closely guarded. As a result of the involvement by the French government, the US has less say in economic decisions in the Gulf. France of course will also be able to influence any political decisions that are to be made within the region because they are to a great degree a main provider of security for them. Any plots for governmental destabilization within any of the six Gulf States would necessarily involve the French military and government2.

The decision to set up a French military base in Abu Dhabi seems like a win-win situation for France and the UAE. However, both governments are walking a narrow path. If the French government wants to continue playing a major role in the region and at the same time increase its role in NATO, its interests and plans should be to a degree, independent from the US. If not Frances image in the Gulf will gradually be dented. Moreover, France will be seen as another puppet of the US. At the moment the UAE is viewed negatively by Iran and will consequently be a target of Iranian rhetoric whenever possible. The UAE might also be a possible target by radical Islamic groups if ever they decide to strengthen its military ties with the French and become a visible ally of the NATO1b.

French commitment to Persian Gulf security is vital because it gives the Gulf States more ability to resist Iranian intimidation. Without this and the US military support, the six Gulf States will succumb to the requests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Concern about Persian Gulf security is not exclusive to the US and France other countries, including Britain have also been involved. In 1970, during Britains withdrawal from the region, the US Navy enhanced its presence in the Gulf. Throughout the 1970s, Washington relied on the Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard the Gulf and check the pan-Arabism of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. However, it was only in 1987, when the US Navy launched Operation Earnest Will to reflag Kuwaiti tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, that the US used direct military force to protect the gulf.

In the re-election victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, UAE and Qatar quickly congratulated him. Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Omans Sultan also travelled to Iran in August in connection with the said victory. Qatars Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani has been discussing with Iran about their economic cooperation. This happened on August 27, 2009, a day after Irans envoy to Bahrain called on the GCC to stop employing foreign forces.  The New York Times reported in May that Oman and the UAE increasingly rely on mutual interest trade with Iran, which is an important political and economic ally that is too powerful and too potentially dangerous to ignore, let alone antagonize.  These are the symptoms of the GCC slowly accommodating of the power of the Islamic Republic. Irans talk of indigenizing regional security is slowly gaining a following. It has appealed especially to Qatar as a recent Defense Cooperation Agreement shows. 28 Bahrain has also shown an eagerness to bow down to growing Iranian power as shown by their bilateral energy agreements.

Conclusion
To make a long discussion short, what we want to answer in this paper is the question What are the effects of the French-UAE military agreement in the Arabian Gulf First of all this France-UAE tie signals a gradual internationalization of the regions defence system which contradicts the Iranian hopes of indigenization. Together with this military agreement comes French cultural, political and economical influences that would purportedly benefit the said Gulf State. The UAE, being a neighbour of a global enemy is potentially at risk from any destabilization due to war that might occur in the event that Iran decides to unleash its rumoured power.

To some degree, the establishment of a French military base is a sort of neo-colonialism akin to what European countries in the 1400s and beyond did to South and Southeast Asian countries like India and the Philippines.  UAE, overall however sees France in a positive light. Iran can be compared to a group of nationalistic rebels fighting for independence from foreign power.      The fact that France has by and large managed to blend in well in a region historically dominated by Anglo- Saxon presence, and now mainly American, is partly due to the fact that the country has portrayed itself amongst the Western group, as an alternative in, matters of defense partnerships. Based on customary diplomacy and accredited for its knowledge of the Arab world and the more objective tone of its stand on the Israeli- Palestinian clash and tensions in the Middle East, France has built on its strengths to appear as a partner capable of guaranteeing the security of the Arab dominions of the Persian Gulf.
   
By operating in that region today, under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, France is emphasizing further its military cooperation and presence. It is with the aim of outrivaling and committing to technological, military and industrial policy, along with a more solid view on strategic security issues that President Sarkozy intends to realize a new approach in the region. The aim of the new tactical approach of intensifying French presence in the Gulf region is defending sources of energy supply, transferring and exporting advanced industrial technology, as well as assisting in the training of young local talent.
   
The now important role of France as one of the players undertaking the stability and the security in the Gulf States is steadily establishing itself through its military and industrial expertise rather than its explicit diplomacy acknowledged more generally in the Middle East situation and in the issues of the Near-East.  This new French approach is much more in tune with realism and an Anglo-Saxon method and is more dynamic in the field of operations, giving support to the export of military equipment but also more in tune with the whole Atlantic.
   
Frances desire to amplify its influence with the United States justifies its return to military command of NATO, officially announced at the 60th anniversary of the NATO Treaty at the summit of Strasbourg (April2-4, 2009). While France may have positioned itself as an ally that complements the military presence of America in the Gulf, it is also increasingly being regarded as a leading competitor in deterrence (Gust contracts with the UAE and Kuwait) and military equipment.
   
There is an honest desire in all Gulf countries to capitalize on the image of the UAE and it will be interesting to track the implications of Frances new military diplomacy in reinforcing its presence in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the country gives the impression of openly supporting the security guarantees that the United States provides, however at the same time, France is forced to compete more directly with its American ally, in matters of obtaining contracts for state-of-the-art military gear under the rule of interoperability within NATO. It can be said that this French politico-strategic re-orientation in the Persian Gulf, more aligned with the Atlantist strategy, may be pursued to the detriment of the so-called Arab policy carried out by France in the Middle East, which was the main motivator behind that countrys rising credence towards Gulf States.

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