Political Science

The American invasion of Iraq, in the view of many theorists of international relations stands out as a unique event which has been difficult to explain with the existing realist theories of international relations. This essay analyses Dr. Mohammed Nuruzzamans paper,  Beyond the Realist Theories Neo-Conservative Realism and the American Invasion of Iraq  to ascertain the validity of his thesis and arguments.

Dr. Nuruzzaman argues that the American invasion of Iraq defies explanation based on realist theories of international relations and that a new theoretical framework, which he terms as neo-conservative realism was more valid in providing a suitable theoretical construct for the event (Nuruzzaman, 2006, p. 242). The author argues that all realist theories require the presence of anarchy and a perceived struggle for power between major powers and rising powers. In the case of invasion of Iraq, American actions first started with a declaration of war on terror against a non-state actor, the Al-Qaeda which was then linked to Iraq, a weak state. In both cases, the theoretical framework of classical realism and structural realism fail to explain American actions. Existing realist theories do not talk about conflict between state and non-state actors and nor do they predict conflict between a hegemon and a weak state as was the dynamic between the U.S. and Iraq. The answer, according to Nuruzzaman lay in the rise of neo-conservative realism which could be defined as a parochial realist approach to promote narrow national interests and security conceived and nurtured by a small section of elites (Nuruzzaman, p. 252). The principles of neo-conservative realism as arrived by Nuruzzaman are Strengthen American defense to support American global leadership, expand the empire of liberty and freedom, democracy and free market, if necessary by fighting a few savage wars of peace and effectively deal with, replace or liquidate regimes or organizations hostile to American values and interests (Nuruzzaman, p. 256).  

Nuruzzaman develops his thesis by first examining the tenets of classical realism as articulated by Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr and Hans J Morgenthau. The author says that classical realism requires anarchic nature and human aggressiveness as two conditions that cause war (Nuruzzaman, p. 243). Though some amount of human aggressiveness was present in the extant case, the conditions between America and Iraq did not qualify for an anarchic rationale. Hence classical realism fails to explain the event.

Nuruzzaman next turns to structural realism of Kenneth Waltz that predicated the existence of an international system of balance of power where each state strove to maintain its position in the hierarchy of powers where states tended to counter a powerful state by forming a counterbalance of power (Nuruzzaman, p. 243). Nuruzzaman argues that such a differential did not exist between the U.S., a superpower and a weak state such as Iraq and hence Waltz structural realism fails to explain the American invasion of Iraq.

Nuruzzaman then examines defensive realists like Glaser, Lynn-Jones, Snyder, Van Evera and Walt who propounded the concept of offense-defense. The offense-defense theory postulates that nations will be tempted to resort to wars if they estimate that conquest would be easy. But defensive realists claim that states prefer status quo and that defensive balance of power was more favored by them rather than war (Nuruzzaman, p. 245). Thus defensive realist theories, according to Nuruzzaman did not explain American behavior. Offensive realists like Copeland, Labs, Mearsheimer and Zakaria argue that the inability for states to predict the intentions of other states force them to resort to war to maximize their power and bring them benefits (Nuruzzaman, p. 245). Nuruzzaman argues that this tenet is less supported by historical evidence as the U.S. did not leverage its economic and military superiority during the Cold War to directly fight a war with the Soviet Union (Nuruzzaman, p. 246).
Nuruzzaman analyses the Bush Doctrine to find clues for Americas actions in invading Iraq. The author states that radicalism and technology (Nuruzzaman, p. 248) were the main threats identified by the Bush administration as a rationale for invading Iraq. The logic forwarded is that Al-Qaeda posed a threat to American democratic values and the world order and that Saddam Hussein had links to that organization. The technology angle postulated that Iraq was pursuing a weapons of mass destruction program that threatened American interests and world peace and hence a preventive war by America was justified. Nuruzzaman then dismisses the notion that securing Iraqs oil was a major reason for America to go to war, as was consistent with the offensive realist theories, on the grounds that America had enough reserves of oil and sufficient influence in the Persian Gulf.

Nuruzzaman makes a compelling argument that the invasion of Iraq was a result of convergence of neo-conservative individuals in the Bush administration who had fervent belief in American exceptionalism and the will to engage hostile regimes (Nuruzzaman, p. 254). While such an argument may sound like a valid opinion, it does not yield itself to formulation of a new theory of international relations. Theories require a sound scientific construct backed by historical precedence. Nuruzzamans theory is not backed by any historical argument and his claim that American action was a new phenomenon does not hold water as unilateral action, preventive or preemptive wars have ancient historical precedence right from the days of the Greek city states. Contrary to Nuruzzamans contention, the Offense-Defense theory does explain the American invasion of Iraq to a large extent. Here was a country with the third largest oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, ruled by a despot having very few friends in the world with a weak military power. From the Offense-defense perspective, a cost-benefit analysis for American planners would have revealed disproportionate gains in carrying out the invasion as compared to the risks. Oil did to a large extent determine the reasons why America went to war in Iraq. Nuruzzamans paper lacks any empirical evidence to support his arguments. The entire argument reads more like a good article rather than serious scholarly work as even his refutations of existing realist theories appear unconvincing and contrived.

In conclusion it can stated that Dr. Mohammed Nuruzammans paper on postulating a new realist theory for explaining American behavior in invading Iraq makes compelling reading but is based on shaky grounds. The author offers no historical proof or scientific argumentative analysis for his postulates which sound more like opinions or speculation rather than scholarly formulations. The authors selective analysis of offensive realists to dismiss their validity in explaining the invasion does not add credibility to his theoretical postulate of neo-conservative realism and hence the theory would require a more detailed methodology to be accepted by IR theorists.